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The Delegation Framework is a collection of programs, network protocols and library
interfaces that provide fine-grained delegation of authority to network systems. The
design and implementation of the Delegation Framework focus on addressing some of
the stumbling blocks that have prevented delegation systems from becoming widely
deployed in real world network applications. The Delegation Framework makes it pos-
sible to integrate delegation into an existing client-server network application without
modification to the network application protocol. A dynamic library interposition im-
plementation also make it possible to integrate delegation into large classes of legacy
client and service programs with minimal or no manual source code modification.
An integration case study describes the process of grafting the Delegation Framework
onto a simple Apache- and MySQL-based network application and analyzes the added
overhead incurred by the application.
Thesis Supervisor: Stuart Schechter
Title: Research Scientist, MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Thesis Supervisor: Hari Balakrishnan
Title: Professor
This work is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Air Force Contract F8721-05-C-0002.
Opinions, interpretations, conclusions and recommendations are those of the author and are not
necessarily endorsed by the United States Government.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Stuart Schechter for advising me on this work. The seed of
the project was his. I must also graciously thank Hari Balakrishnan for taking the
official "thesis supervisor" role, providing valuable feedback, and donating his time
to evaluating this work. Rob Figueiredo and Cynthia McClain were both helpful in
dealing with various technical subtleties.
I cannot forget to give enormous credit where it is due to many folks over the
years. Thanks to all my great teachers along the way: Hal Abelson, Hari Balakrishnan
(again), Robert Berwick, Joseph Birzes, David Ciarlo, Munther Dahleh, Tony Eng,
Robin Farr, D. J. Fromal, Joseph Carapucci, Eric Grimson, Frans Kaashoek, Steven
Leeb, Walter Lewin, Arthur Mattuck, Robert T. Morris, Ron Rivest, Donald Sadoway,
Jay Scheib, Edward Sherretta, Stephen Ward, Alan Willsky, Patrick Winston, Daniel
Witzner, Victor Zue, and all my good TAs whose names I have forgotten.
Thanks to Gnarls Barkley, Hard-Fi, Interpol, Jamiroquai, John Legend, Massive
Attack, Paul Oakenfold, Red Hot Chili Peppers, The Streets, Thievery Corporation,
and all the other great music that I love (but will never fit on this page) for keeping
me sane.
And last but not least, I would like to thank Chris, Maggie, and Hope Stockwell
for being encouraging when times were tough. You guys are great, and I'll see you at
"home" in Montana soon!

Contents
1 Introduction 15
1.1 Delegation of Authority ......................... 16
1.1.1 Coarse-Grained Delegation is Ubiquitous . ........... 16
1.1.2 Precise and Explicit Delegation . ................ 17
1.2 Deployability Problems for Delegation Systems . ............ 18
1.2.1 Lack of Support in Application Protocols ............ 19
1.2.2 Integration with Legacy Code . ................. 19
1.2.3 Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19
1.2.4 Performance ............................ 20
1.3 Making Delegation Deployable ................. ....... 20
2 Related Work 23
2.1 Distributed Authorization and Delegation . .............. 23
2.1.1 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1.2 Applications ............................ 24
2.2 Trust Management Systems ................... .... 29
2.3 Other Related Work ........................... 31
2.3.1 Extensibility through Interposition . .............. 31
2.3.2 Checking Authorization Policies in Legacy Code ........ 32
3 Design Overview 35
3.1 Delegation Credentials .......................... 35
3.1.1 Delegation Certificates ................... ... 36
3.1.2 Authorization Policy Statements . ............... 36
3.2 Network Protocols ............................ 37
3.2.1 The Delegation Protocol ..................... 37
3.2.2 The Speaks For Layer Protocol . ................ 40
3.3 Framework Architecture ......................... 42
3.3.1 The Delegation Agent ...................... 42
3.3.2 The Delegation Framework Library . .............. 43
3.3.3 The Components Working in Concert . ............. 44
4 Delegation Credentials 47
4.1 Delegation and Identity Certificates . .................. 47
4.1.1 Identity Certificates ........................ 47
4.1.2 Delegation Certificates ...................... 48
4.2 Identity Names .................... ...... ... 50
4.3 Authorization Policies .......................... 51
4.4 Credential Structure and Validity . .................. . 52
4.4.1 Credential Structure ....................... 53
4.4.2 Credential Validity ............... ....... .. 55
4.4.3 Credential Verification .................... .. 56
5 The Delegation and Speaks For Layer Protocols
5.1 Application Protocol Model . ...........
5.2 Protocols Working Together . ...........
5.3 Diagram Notation ..................
5.3.1 Protocol Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4 Delegation Protocol Channel Setup ........
5.4.1 Finding a Service's Delegation Agent . . .
5.4.2 Encrypted Channel Setup . ........
5.4.3 Mutual Authentication . ..........
5.5 The Speaks For Layer ...............
5.5.1 Authenticating SpeaksFor Messages . . . .
59
. . . 59
. . . 61
.. . 62
. . . 63
. . . 64
. . . 64
. . . 64
. . . 65
.. . 68
. . . 70
5.6 Protocols in Two-level Transactions . . . . . . .
5.6.1 When a Client is Unable to Demonstrate
5.7 Requesting Credentials from the User ......
5.8 Protocols in Three-level Transactions ......
5.9 A Priori Delegation and Demonstration .
5.10 Protocols in n-level Transactions . . . . . . . .
Authority
6 The Delegation Agent
6.1 Delegation Agent architecture . ............... . .
6.2 Handling Events .........................
6.2.1 Handling a Legacy Client's New Connection Report . .
6.2.2 Handling a New Parent-Child Relationship .......
6.2.3 Handling a "Speaks For" Report . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2.4 Handling a Reference Monitor Call . ..........
6.2.5 Handling the Delegate or DemonstrateAuthority Chain
6.2.6 Handling a NoAuthority Message Response .......
6.2.7 Handling a Connection Shutdown . ...........
7 The Delegation Framework Library
7.1 Automating the Library Calls .......
7.1.1 Authorization Checks in Deputies
7.2 The Speaks For Layer Protocol Interface
7.2.1 sfl_write_speaks-for()......
7.2.2 sf lwrite_data () .........
7.2.3 sfl.read()O .............
7.3 The Socket Event Reporting Interface . . .
7.3.1 reportsocketsetup() ......
7.3.2 report socketdependency () . . .
7.3.3 reportsocketspeaks_for() . . .
7.3.4 reportsocketshutdown() ....
7.4 The Reference Monitoring Interface . . . .
95
............... 96
. .. . . .. . .. . . . .. 97
. .. . .. . . . .. . . .. 98
.. . . .. . . . .. . . .. 98
............... 99
............... 99
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . 100
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
. . .. . . .. . . .. . . . 103
103
7.4.1 check_authority().................
7.5 Dynamic Interposition Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.5.1 Loading the Interposition Library . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.5.2 Inferring Socket Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.5.3 The Interposition Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8 Integration Study of Apache and MySQL
8.1 M ySQ L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.1.1 Existing Authorization Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . .
8.1.2 Crafting MySQL Authorization Policies . . . . . . . . .
8.1.3 Adding Delegation Framework Authorization Checks .
8.2 A pache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....
8.2.1 Automatic Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2.2 Challenges for Web Application Authorization Policies
8.3 Client Programs ..........................
8.4 Delegation Framework Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4.1 Experimental Setup ....................
8.4.2 Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 Conclusion
9.1 Contributions .......................
9.1.1 Protocol Support for Delegation of Authority
9.1.2 Integration of Delegation into Legacy Software
9.2 Future W ork ........ ...............
9.2.1 Fully-automated Integration . . . . . . . . . . .
9.2.2 Usability ............... ......
129
........ 129
. . . . . . . . 129
. . . . . . . . 130
. . . . . . . . 130
. . . . . . . . 130
........ 132
103
104
105
105
106
113
.. 114
.. 114
.. 115
.. 116
.. 120
.. 120
.. 121
122
122
.. 123
.. 125
List of Figures
3-1 The conceptual model of the Delegation Protocol . .......... 38
3-2 A deputy acts on behalf of two clients when communicating via one
application protocol flow ......................... 40
3-3 The contents of a client's Speaks For Layer Protocol-encapsulated ap-
plication protocol flow .......................... 41
3-4 The Delegation Framework architecture . ................ 44
4-1 A sample delegation credential in the Delegation Framework .... . 54
5-1 Delegation Framework protocol stack . ................. 61
5-2 A generic protocol example ....................... 63
5-3 The Delegation Protocol channel setup dialogue . ........... 67
5-4 A Speaks For Layer session ........................ 70
5-5 A client-service dialogue in the Delegation Framework. ........ . 72
5-6 A user-client dialogue in the Delegation Framework .......... 76
5-7 A client-deputy-service dialogue in the Delegation Framework. .... 77
5-8 A client-deputy-service dialogue in the Delegation Framework with a
priori delegation. ............................ 80
6-1 A deputy switches from working on behalf of one client to working on
behalf of another ............................. 86
6-2 A network application requiring the forwarding of messages ...... 87
6-3 The chain of Require* messages and corresponding responses ..... 89

List of Tables
6.1 The Delegation Agent data structures . ................. 83
7.1 Summary of the Delegation Framework Library functions ....... 96
7.2 Summary of the interposition library data structures ......... 107
8.1 Delay statistics for initial HTTP query . ................ 125
8.2 Round trip times between the network application's host pairs . . .. 127
8.3 Delay statistics for subsequent HTTP queries . ............ 127

Chapter 1
Introduction
Access control mechanisms common to many of today's network services blur the
distinction between the operations a user is authorized to perform and the operations
that programs the user employs are authorized to perform. Operating systems control
resource access based on a user identity assigned to a process. Even if a user's
program infrequently or never requires any more than a particular subset of those
user authorities, few access control systems provide a practical mechanism to limit
the authority delegated to the program.
A distinction between a user's authorities and those of the programs the user
employs often does not exist; the user must give a program either all of his authorities
or none of them. This circumstance would be satisfactory for users' security needs if
the various other authority-requiring software that users employ were well-behaved
and perfectly resilient to attack by malicious parties. However, given the ability to
maliciously manipulate a client or service program, an adversary can translate the lack
of distinction between user and program authorities into an opportunity to capture
a user's credentials. The opportunity to capture credentials is especially apparent
when resources are distributed across a network. Many of today's networked systems
require a user to transfer his identity credentials to any remote system that is to make
a request on his behalf.
1.1 Delegation of Authority
Many security mechanisms today provide implicit delegation of coarse-grained au-
thority, such as the authority to assume the user's identity. Making that delegation
explicit and more finely-grained can alleviate the problems resulting from blurring the
identities of users with the identities of their programs. Explicit delegation provides
precise control over what authority is granted to a given program for a particular
period of time, and consequently it becomes more challenging for malicious to abuse
authority derived from a user.
1.1.1 Coarse-Grained Delegation is Ubiquitous
Though not typically called delegation, computer systems often employ security mech-
anisms that are implicitly delegation. Often, a client program (e.g., a web browser)
receives a password typed by a user, which the client program presents as a credential
to prove that it holds authority to access a service on the user's behalf. The user thus
delegates the authority to assume his identity to the client.
Many web applications provide are front-end interfaces through which users access
data stored on an underlying service. These web applications take the role of a deputy,
a network service that makes requests of other network services on a user's behalf.
For example, a web interface to an IMAP mail service forwards a password from a
user to the service. In this case, the deputy web application is delegated the authority
to assume the identity of the client.
Many database-driven web applications rely on code running on the web server to
verify user credentials and make authorization decisions to control access to database
tables. This requires complete trust in the web server's access control. All users
implicitly delegate to the web application the full set of authority to access their
underlying database records. This authority can be easily abused by any adversary
able to compromise the web server.
The salient problem with password credentials and strong trust relationships is
that they only allow coarse-grained (i.e., all or nothing) delegation. It is difficult to
guarantee that a client or deputy does not abuse its authorities without revoking all
of the authorities it has been given, rendering it unusable. A delegation mechanism
for defining and granting more fine-grained sets of authorities to different network
services would benefit a great many of the systems that rely on passwords (and
other client-held user credentials), and strong trust relationships across the interfaces
between deputies and underlying services.
1.1.2 Precise and Explicit Delegation
A variety of research has posited fine-grained delegation of authority as a solution
to limit the scope of potential authority abuses that may result from reliance on
passwords and strong trust relationships in networked systems [13, 17, 18, 26]. Fine-
grained delegation of authority enables an authority holder to grant specific author-
ities to another principal for a specified period of time. If allowed by the delegator,
the delegate may re-delegate this authority further. Delegation and re-delegation al-
low authority to trickle down through a system from the users who hold authorities,
to their client software, to the deputy services those clients rely on to access other
services. A client or deputy may then delegate the authority further or use the cre-
dentials that prove that it has been delegated the authority to access the underlying
resource. Fine-grained delegation enables more explicit control of the amount and
duration of authority users make available to the software they use locally and over
a network, thereby limiting the amount of trust placed in those software programs.
In contrast to the common password-based authorization scenario, credentials
proving delegated authority need not indefinitely grant a client the full set of author-
ities held by the user. Instead, the user is able to specify which of his authorities
the client program may use and for what duration they make be used. Delegation
of authority enables a user to grant different sets of authority to client programs of
varying levels of trustworthiness and different functional requirements. A user need
not be concerned with a compromised client retaining authority after the specified
expiration time.
Additionally, the strength of trust relationships between deputies and the underly-
ing services to which they provide access can be reduced or, in some cases, eliminated
entirely. In a delegation-enabled version of the system consisting of a web application
(a deputy service) and an underlying database service, a user can delegate the deputy
the precise set of authorities required to perform the database operations for the task
requested. The strong trust relationship between the deputy and database service can
be eliminted. Instead of lavishing the web application with a large set of authorities
and trusting the web application to mediate access, authorization checks can take
place at the database that sufficiently verify the user authorized the web application
to perform such requests. The web application (acting as the user's deputy) may
continue to perform authorization checks as before.
Delegation of authority and capabilities systems have been studied for many years
now. Research efforts have addressed many of the problems encountered on the
path to making delegation of authority possible, and demonstrated some interesting
applications. Useful structures of cryptographic certificates for delegation are now
well-defined. Authority description languages make it possible to flexibly describe
arbitrarily fine- or coarse-grained sets of authority. Usable systems designed with
delegation functionality built-in have been constructed and used in laboratory envi-
ronments. If these laboratory success could be carried over into real world systems,
it would improve the security properties of a large class of the network applications
in existence today. Nevertheless, despite these developments in the study delegation
of authority, most network applications have not been successfully adapted to use
delegation for authorization.
1.2 Deployability Problems for Delegation Systems
While delegation has been research extensively, effective delegation of authority mech-
anisms have not become widely deployed in real world systems. This is a classic prob-
lem of a good technology failing to be deployed because it was not designed to be
easily deployable. Redesigning systems and reimplementing client and service soft-
ware to include support for delegation has been impractical, and good methods for
integrating delegation into legacy applications and services have not been deployed1 .
1.2.1 Lack of Support in Application Protocols
Network applications enlisting the support of a delegation systems require protocol
support for requesting and passing delegation credentials between hosts. Application
protocols, the protocols spoken between clients and services at the application layer
across the Internet (such as HTTP, SMTP, IMAP) are often well-specified, standard-
ized protocols that have received the intense scrutiny of working group committees at
standards organizations. Few, if any, standard application are pre-specified to carry
delegated credentials or pair protocol requests with particular credentials. Amending
these protocol specifications to support delegation would be a labor-intensive process
that could take standards organizations years, a common stumbling block for new
security technologies. A better approach to solving the protocol problem must be
developed.
1.2.2 Integration with Legacy Code
Rewriting or modifying legacy software can be prohibitively expensive and error-
prone. Rewriting could also require major changes to access control functions. Source
code may be lengthy, poorly documented and difficult for unacquainted developers
to decipher. Even with a strong understanding of the code, the challenges involved
in the integration process are numerous: major restructuring of a program may be
involved; support for underlying cryptographic operations may need to be added; and
the proper authorization checks can easily be misplaced or omitted.
1.2.3 Usability
If users cannot understand how to use a delegation mechanism, or find using it tedious,
integrating delegation may not actually improve the security of a network application.
'The term legacy as it is employed in this thesis refers to software that was not originally designed
and implemented to have a delegation of authority mechanism and is not intended to make any other
qualitative judgments about the software's age or sophistication.
It may instead make the application more difficult to use. The reasons a user must
delegate authority may not seem obvious to him, and authorization policies specifying
the authorities granted to a delegate are difficult for the novice to craft. Usable
interfaces must be developed to assist users of the system in delegating authority easily
while ensuring that the user's actually receive the security benefits a delegation system
is intended to provide them. The delegation system must also provide whatever
infrastructure support these usability mechanisms require.
1.2.4 Performance
Regardless of how desirable a given authorization mechanism's security benefits are,
the mechanism must be implemented efficiently to be successfully adopted. High
volume Internet services demand security mechanisms that do not severely degrade
the quality of service offered to clients. Considerable effort must be spent designing
and implementing a delegation system with acceptable performance characteristics.
1.3 Making Delegation Deployable
These practical issues have rendered the research successes of delegation of author-
ity difficult to deploy in real world systems. The contribution of this thesis is the
Delegation Framework, which makes strides in addressing many of the problems of
integrating delegation of authority into legacy network applications. The framework
consists of a collection of network protocols, an agent, and a set of library routines
that work together to address various of the deployability challenges facing delegation
of authority. The Delegation Framework makes automatic or near-automatic integra-
tion of delegation into a large class of network applications software a reality, thereby
helping system administrators to more easily deploy delegation-enabled systems to
their users.
Chapter 2 summarizes relevant previous work. Chapter 3 gives an overview of
the Delegation Framework design. Chapter 4 describes the structure of delegation
credentials. Chapter 5 discusses in detail the design of the protocols used by the Del-
egation Framework. Chapter 6 discusses the implementation of the Delegation Agent
program, the cornerstone of the Delegation Framework. Chapter 7 describes the Del-
egation Framework Library, the interface via which legacy software participates in
Delegation Framework-enabled application. Chapter 8 discusses the integration of
the Delegation Framework into an Apache-served web application that utilizes an
underlying MySQL database when generating webpages. Chapter 9 summarizes the
contributions of this work and proposes future work on the Delegation Framework.

Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Distributed Authorization and Delegation
2.1.1 Theory
Butler Lampson et al. dedicated a portion of their seminal work on a general calculus
for access control (the most notable contribution being the "speaks for" relation) to
the theoretical underpinnings of delegation[2, 17]. These works explore formalisms of
delegation as a basic authorization primitive. They also touch on some of the interest-
ing fundamental characteristics of delegation, namely the importance of identifying
a delegate principal as working on behalf of its delegator. A delegate is not simply
Alice, but must use a special identity such as "Alice for Bob" specifying that Alice is
working on Bob's behalf. This provides a theoretical construct for dealing with the
confused deputy problem [14] and highlights the consequent care that must be taken
to avoid the misapplication of authorities delegated from principal Bob when perform-
ing an operation on behalf of a separate principal Charles. The confused deputy is an
fundamental problem that the Delegation Framework, like any reasonable delegation
system should, go to great lengths to avoid.
Gasser and McDermott described the principles for the proper construction of a
delegation architecture [13]. This work has much in common with that of Lampson et
al., but covers delegation exclusively whereas Lampson et al. treat delegation within
a larger discussion. The paper serves as a tutorial on the delegation primitive and
explores the mechanics of delegation in more depth than Lampson et al.. Certificate
structure, delegation expiration, and delegating subsets of authority are among the
issues they consider. Many of the presented ideas are leveraged in the Delegation
Framework.
2.1.2 Applications
Kerberos [21] is a distributed authentication system that uses a trusted server to
authenticate clients on behalf of the services they use. Following an authentication
protocol between the client and Kerberos service, the Kerberos service issues the client
a credential called a ticket. The client then supplies this ticket to the other services it
uses to prove its authority. The trusted server may specify a "OK-AS-DELEGATE"
flag within the tickets granted to the client. With this flag set, the user may delegate
the authority associated with their credentials using a proxy ticket. The primary
drawback of delegation using Kerberos is that it requires a central trusted server. The
central trusted server is considerable drawback for security, flexibility, and availability
of services. The Delegation Framework can provide delegation without reliance on
a central trusted online component; a delegation between a delegator and delegate
requires no involvement on behalf of a trusted third party.
The Taos operating system [32] provides an operating system level implementa-
tion of the concepts devised in the authors' theoretical work [2, 17] including roles,
groups, secure channels, and delegation. Each host includes a component called the
authentication agent which manages knowledge of principals and their associated
credentials. The authentication agent runs in user space, and each application is
linked with the necessary means to communicate with it. Agents on different hosts
are able to communicate with one another, allowing authentication primitives such
as delegation to be applied across hosts. The Delegation Framework incorporates
an authentication agent-like component, called the delegation agent, but allows that
each user and each individual client and service program have its own authentication
agent for clearer isolation of user authority from the authority held by individual
programs. The major drawback for the Taos approach is that today, more than ten
years after the original research on Taos took place, widespread support for delegation
primitives in popular operating systems has not materialized. Requiring operating
system support has greatly hinders deployability. The Delegation Framework favors
an approach implemented entirely in user space so that system administrators can
enabled the delegation primitive in the clients and services running on their hosts
without complex kernel modifications.
A number of systems with delegation or delegation-like mechanisms are imple-
mented in userspace and operate successfully without operating systems (as in Taos)
or the support of a trusted third party (as in Kerberos). These userspace mechanisms
tend to have much better deployability characteristics. However, existing userspace
implementations do not fully realize the delegation solution.
Once such system is the popular Secure Shell (SSH) protocol [4], most notably the
OpenSSH implementation [22]. SSH has enjoyed wide deployment as an answer to the
telnet remote login program's security issues. The SSH protocol specifies support
for a delegation-like mechanism called agent forwarding, and OpenSSH users may
employ a program called ssh-agent that manages the user's public keys and engages
in authorization protocols on behalf of user's SSH clients. When a user logs into a
remote host, the user may specify an optional flag that causes the client to delegate
the user's authority, allowing the remote host to act as his deputy. The "delegation"
technique is called agent forwarding, and allows any SSH clients executed on the
remote host to ask the user's ssh-agent on local host to engage in an authorization
protocol on its behalf. With agent forwarding, it is not possible for the user to
delegate a subset of his authority to the deputy host, only all or none of his authority.
Also problematic is the lack of an is no opportunity to the agent to later revoke an
authorization of a remote login; a deputy may maintain a persistent connection to
the host authorized by the agent indefinitely and use or abuse the user's authorities
on that host.
REX [16] is a remote execution system that improves upon agent forwarding
mechanism of SSH. Like SSH, REX allows the forwarding of access to a credential
management agent to the user's remote execution environment upon login to a remote
machine. Unlike SSH, the REX agent will present a confirmation dialogue box to the
user when a remote rex command attempts to use the forwarded agent. The dialogue
box asks the user whether to trust the host in question. This allows a user to build
a policy dictating which hosts the agent delegates the user's credentials over time.
This is an improvement when compared to SSH, but the mechanism is still course
grained; the user's decision is binary in that the user can only delegate all or none of
his authority to any given host.
SSH and REX are powerful tools for remote execution with delegation-like mech-
anism. However, they are not architected to allow explicit fine-grained delegation of
authority to deputy hosts for precisely defined periods of time. Nevertheless, some
characteristics of SSH and REX have influenced the design of the Delegation Frame-
work: no special operating system support requirements, credential management
agents, and communication channels dedicated to passing credentials and request
for credentials between client agents and deputies.
Other userspace-implemented systems resolve some problems with SSH and REX
by employing explicit certificate-based delegation mechanisms. One such system,
called PorKI [26], allows PDA users to store their credentials and delegate their au-
thorities to client machines, such as computer lab terminals, of which the level of
trustworthiness is less than ideal. Rather than enter a static password into a terminal
machine, a user can delegate the terminal temporary credentials using proxy certifi-
cates created on the PDA and transmitted to the client machine via the Bluetooth
wireless protocol. System administrators specify different trust levels for the client
terminals they administrate. The user's proxy certificate specifies authorization poli-
cies for each trust level, thereby allow client machines in each trust level different
sets of authorities. The delegated credentials are sufficient for the user to access his
network resources reasonably while limiting the set of authorities leaked in the event
of the client machine's compromise. The user's authorities may only be exploited
temporarily whilst delegated credentials on a client machine remain valid. The user's
cryptographic keys remain isolated on the PDA and the password protecting them
is never typed into an unfamiliar machine where it could be captured. PorKI is an
improvement over the status quo, but it focuses on concerns of untrustworthy client
machines and consequently allows only single-level delegations to client machines. It
is not possible for programs on the client host to re-delegate authority to a deputy
across a network, or for the deputy to re-delegate authority to another deputy, and
so on. While allowing a somewhat more fine-grained mechanism than SSH and REX
and allowing delegations for precise periods of time, the limited form of delegation
provided by PorKI does not allow the large amount of trust placed in the deputies
of many systems to be eliminated. The Delegation Framework allows for arbitrary
levels of delegation and re-delegation to support whatever system architectures that
may be interested in employing delegation, and thereby allow for strongly trusted
deputies to be replaced with delegate deputies wherever they may exist.
The Grey System [5], a system similar in many respects to PorKI, uses smart-
phones for delegation of authority to access both physical and virtual resources and
allows users to delegate their authority to one another. Users may delegate creden-
tials authorizing access to client machines, network resources, and physical spaces
to one another using smartphones that communicate via Bluetooth- or SMS-based
protocols. Unlike PorKI, users employ the smartphone (or PDA) as a delegate for
accessing any of the aforementioned resources, not just a delegating credential man-
agement agent. Provided that PDAs or smartphones become highly ubiquitous and
can effectively secure the data they store, their physical, not merely virtual, separa-
tion for the potentially untrustworthy client machines make them excellent candidates
as trusted devices on which users store their credentials and perform delegations. The
Delegation Framework does not presently support PDA or smartphone devices, and
therefore user cryptographic keys must be stored on any client machines they use.
However, the Delegation Framework can support a PDA- or smarthphone-based im-
plementation provided that a PDA or smartphone supports TCP/IP and can perform
a few important cryptographic operations.
SPKI/SDSI [9] (a project resulting from the merger of two formerly separate
projects, SPKI and SDSI) builds on the delegation theory work of Gasser and Mc-
Dermot [13]. The SPKI/SDSI work describes attribute certificates (mapping authority
to identities) and authorization certificates (mapping authority to a public key). In
an attribute (authorization) certificate, an issuing principal specifies some set of au-
thority to be delegated to a subject principal for a specified period of time. Making
an authorization decision involves following a chain of attribute (authorization) cer-
tificates back to a trusted issuer. In SPKI/SDSI, this trust issuer need not be globally
trusted as in traditional PKI. Following the certificate chain, the set of authority ul-
timately held by the subject at the bottom of the chain must be the intersection of
all the sets of authority specified by each attribute (authorization) certificate along
the chain. The intersection operation prevents any principal from authorizing the use
of authority it does not hold or is not authorized to assign to another principal. The
certificates used to delegate authority in the Delegation Framework are very similar
to attribute certificates of SPKI/SDSI.
The term "delegation" is used in a variety of topical areas in computer science.
Other systems refer talk about delegating tasks to software agents. The C# pro-
gramming languages offer a "delegate" keyword for specifying callback methods in
event-driven systems. Specifically within the area of network- and security-focused re-
search, the Delegation Framework shares something of a naming collision with other
systems that describe "delegation" or "delegating architectures". The Delegation
Framework uses the term delegation in the sense of passing authorities from one
principal to another such that the recipient of the delegation becomes authorized to
perform tasks on the issuer's behalf. It is worth noting the difference between the
Delegation Framework and other "delegation" or "delegating" architectures.
The Delegation-Oriented Architecture (DOA) [29] is a research effort aimed at re-
solving many of the problems associated with network "middleboxes" such as packet
filters, network address translators, and transparent caches. DOA reintroduces a
Internet-wide flat name space for all hosts (a role once served by the IP address space
that has been diminished due to prevalence of network address translators) using
what are called endpoint identifiers (EIDs). A host may specify a vector of EIDs in
packet headers to explicitly redirect its packets to a middlebox or sequence of mid-
dleboxes whose functionality the host's administrator desires. This allows for greatly
flexibility in the architecture of networks with middleboxes, allowing the middleboxes
to be removed from points inline between end hosts and the internet. DOA focuses on
specifically on delegating network-level packet manipulation tasks to remote packet
processing hosts such as network address translators and firewalls, whereas the Dele-
gation Framework focuses on the delegation of tasks (and their associated authority)
to remote hosts at the level of application protocols.
Ostia [12] employs a "delegating architecture" to produce more effective appli-
cation execution sandboxing. The sandboxed application requests operating system
resources by way of a controlling agent program, thereby implicitly delegating the
task to the agent. While Ostia, like the Delegation Framework, is motivated by the
desire to minimize the abuse of authorities, the manner in which it employs the idea
of delegation is quite different. In the Delegation Framework, and many of the delega-
tion systems described above, a principal holding a set of authorities delegates those
authorities to a principal that is less privileged. Ostia's approach is the reverse; an
unprivileged process delegates the task of obtaining authority to perform a particular
operation to a more privileged controlling process. Further, Ostia focus on executing
environment sandboxing limits the target set of authorities to those provided on the
local host.
2.2 Trust Management Systems
Trust and authorization policy issues are at the core of the debate on authorization
in networked applications. A body of work on "trust management systems" has iden-
tified the need for flexible mechanisms able to express complex authorization policies
and trust relationships that is independent of the needs of a particular system. This
allows for general policies that apply across a range of applications rather than being
geared toward a specific one. Trust management systems typically consist of policy
description languages for the specification of trust relationships and trust-requiring
operations, and compliance checking algorithms for the evaluation of authorization
statements written in the policy language.
Trust management systems are important in delegation of authority systems due to
a need for a clear specification of delegated authority. The set of authorities delegated
to a given principal must be unambiguously described, and the policy languages of
trust management systems are useful for this task. Trust management systems suggest
a useful way to think about the delegation of authority mechanism: delegation of
authority enables users (holders of authority) to dynamically define and distribute
policies pertaining to the authority they wield.
Blaze et al. engaged in the seminal work on trust management systems, building
a system they called PolicyMaker [7]. PolicyMaker uses filters to specify under which
conditions given policy assertions apply. The policy language itself is very simple,
allowing 1) policy assertions with specific filters, and 2) query statements used to
determine whether a given request is permitted by a given policy. PolicyMaker asser-
tions and filters are implemented in a "safe" (i.e., does not have access to filesystem
or network resources) version of the AWK interpreted language. The AWK variant
is a language contained within the PolicyMaker policy language, and could be sub-
stituted by any "safe" interpreted language. While PolicyMaker's stated aim is to
separate trust management mechanisms from the workings of the target system itself,
its reliance on the AWK language programs leads to a situation in which assertions
and filters become complex and application-specific. The PolicyMaker framework
around this language is certainly application independent, but this "independence"
(a heralded benefit of trust management systems) is not implicitly transfered to the
assertions and filters written by system designers.
Usability is a major concern with trust management systems as they are applied
to the Delegation Framework. If users can be expected to delegate authority in
a fine-grained manner, there must exist a means for them to define policies to be
contained in the certificates they pass to delegates. Trust management systems' policy
languages are beyond the grasp of novice users, and even knowledgeable users will
find them tedious to deal with. This problem is a major obstacle for the Delegation
Framework which presently relies on a simple, home-grown policy definition language.
The Delegation Framework is not tightly bound in its design or implementation to
any particular trust management system, leaving room for future adaptations.
2.3 Other Related Work
A essential part of making the Delegation Framework practically deployable requires
that it be possible to easily integrate the Delegation Framework with existing soft-
ware. A few key implementation techniques that have been adopted in the Delegation
Framework, or show promise for future adoption, can drastically ease the challenge
of integrating delegation into exist client and service software. These are essential to
making the Delegation Framework truly practical.
2.3.1 Extensibility through Interposition
A great deal of previous work has explored system call and dynamic library interpo-
sition as a technique for extending the functionality of existing interfaces [8, 24, 12,
15, 25, 28]. Interposition mechanisms allow system and library interface calls to be
intercepted and redirected to new routines, allowing the interface to be modified or
replaced entirely with a new implementation. Consequently, it becomes possible to
modify the behavior of programs using interposition without modifying the programs
themselves. In the following examples, interposition mechanisms make it possible for
to transparently retrofit software with the following functionality without modifying
the software's source code:
* profiling and debugging [8]
* execution environment restriction mechanisms [24, 12]
* file and socket encryption and compression [15]
* insertion of protocol stack layers between transport and application [25]
. network distribution of computationally-intensive calculations [28]
The Delegation Framework leverages some of these ideas using dynamic library inter-
position, causing the target software to augment the data transmitted within the TCP
sockets with useful metadata using ideas derived from Tesla [25], and to pass data
back and forth with a local agent program that may initiate network communications
of its own from based on ideas from Jones [15] and Thain & Livny [28].
2.3.2 Checking Authorization Policies in Legacy Code
An important and challenging task for integrating the Delegation Framework is prop-
erly instrumenting service software with authorization checks. Many code integration
problems can be solved automatically with dynamic library interposition, but this
authorization check instrumentation problem is not one of them. Dynamic interpo-
sition techniques offer the possibility of placing authorization checks at well-known
library interfaces, but a useful correspondence between these library interfaces and
the interfaces offered by many network application services may not exist in a given
case. Instrumenting a service with Delegation Framework authorization checks via
dynamic library interposition is a task that cannot be accomplished in a sufficiently
general way for all service software.
Recent research suggests other difficulties facing this instrumentation task. Xi-
aolan Zhang et al. have conducted work using the static analysis tool CQUAL in
which they analyze the placement of authorization checks within the Linux kernel by
the Linux Security Modules [33]. Rather than place these authorization checks at
a well-know interface such as the system call interface, the Linux Security Modules
placed them internally deeply within the kernel. They developed techniques using
CQUAL to verify automatically whether authorization hooks completely covered all
access modalities. Zhang et al. found that the manual work performed by well-
qualified individuals placing these authorization checks was error prone, difficult to
verify manually, and left the kernel vulnerable to exploitation. Though Zhang et al.
focused on kernel code, which is known for being particularly complex and difficult
to understanding and for which there exist fewer experience developers, Integrating
authorization checks into the Delegation Framework is likely similarly error-prone.
The current design of the Delegation Framework, having only made manual instru-
mentation of service source code as easily as possible, does not fully address these
major challenges.
However, recent work has successfully retrofitted legacy software with authoriza-
tion policy enforcement hooks using static program analysis techniques [11]. This
work acknowledges the need for security solutions that are deployable and can be
integrated into legacy software. Their work describes two techniques, one which iden-
tifies the location of "security-sensitive operations" in a program's executable code
and, based on its results, one for subsequently instrumenting the code to include
reference monitor calls into an authorization checking routine based. The identifica-
tion technique looks for locations where the code performs "primitive operations on
critical server resources." Provided that the identification technique is effective, its
plausible that their instrumentation techniques could be adapted to insert Delegation
Framework authorization checks based on this identification information. However,
a study of the applicability of these techniques to the Delegation Framework has not
yet been explored.

Chapter 3
Design Overview
The design of the Delegation Framework is informed by needs of a delegation system
as outlined in theoretical work on delegation [2, 17, 13], the design choices employed
in many research efforts in delegation systems [32, 16, 26, 5, 9], and deployability
problems from which many technologies suffer (see Chapter 1). Much of the Delega-
tion Framework design is derived from previous work. Where noted, design decisions
have been influenced by the aim of improving deployability.
3.1 Delegation Credentials
A credential proving that a principal holds a particular set of authorities in the Dele-
gation Framework is comprised of a sequence of cryptographically signed statements
that prove that authority has been delegated. These signed statements take the form
of X.509 certificates. Taken together, a sequence of these certificates forms a proof of
delegation. A significant portion of the functionality the Delegation Framework is de-
voted to dealing with proofs: constructing and signing them, requesting and passing
them between principals, verify their authenticity, and mapping the authorities they
prove to authority-requiring operations. Effectively supporting proofs of delegation
requires properly-structured certificates and a language in which the authorities to
be delegated can be described.
3.1.1 Delegation Certificates
The Delegation Framework proofs are comprised of two types of certificates: delega-
tion certificates that map authorization policies to identities, and identity certificates
that map a principal's identity to a public key. An issuing principal produces a dele-
gation certificate to assert an authorization policy describing how a subject principal
may use the issuer's authority, signing it with a public key. A chain of delegation
certificates form the backbone of a proof of delegation, each certificate authorizing
the issuer of the next certificate in the chain.
A delegation certificate may actually assigned more authority that its issuer holds.
This is permitted because a principal's authorities can change over time, and a dele-
gation certificate may have been created prior to the expiration of a subset of those
authorities. The expiration of one subset of authority does not invalidate other au-
thorities held by the delegator. Therefore, a delegation certificate authorizes the
intersection of the set of authority held by the delegator and the set of authority
the certificate assigns to the delegate. When a sequence of delegation certificates is
chained together (forming a proof of delegation), a whole series of these intersection
operations occurs as each delegate re-delegates the authority it has been delegated.
Identity certificates, familiar from various PKI systems, are used to map identity
to keys so that the signatures on delegation certificates can be check during the proof
verification process. In addition to use in proofs, the Delegation Framework uses
identity certificates during peer authentication. The Delegation Framework does not
depend on any particular PKI system so long as it securely maps identities to public
keys.
3.1.2 Authorization Policy Statements
Delegation certificates must include a statement of the authorities assigned to the
delegate using an authorization policy language. The Delegation Framework design
is not bound to any particular language. However, because the set of authorities
authorized by a proof of delegation is generated by taking the intersection of the
authorization statements contained in each delegation certificate, it should be possible
to represent the intersection of any two policy statements defined in the language.
If a tractable algorithm for computing the intersection of two policies does not
exist, it is suitable for a service to retain all of the authorization statements in a given
proof. In such a scenario, checking whether a given access request is authorized by the
proof amounts to checking whether the required access authorities are authorized by
each of the policies contained in each of the proof's delegation certificates. Therefore,
any of the policy definition languages from the various trust management systems
could function sufficiently in this role.
3.2 Network Protocols
Section 1.2.1 described issues related to network protocol support for delegation. To
deal with these issues, the Delegation Framework provides two new protocols, the
Delegation Protocol and the Speaks For Layer Protocol. These protocols provide the
communication needs of the Delegation Framework without requiring modifications
to application protocols. Chapter 5 describes the Delegation Protocol and Speaks
For Layer Protocol in greater detail.
3.2.1 The Delegation Protocol
The Delegation Protocol provides peer principals with a separate channel through
which they negotiate the client's authority to access the service via application pro-
tocol flows. The Delegation Protocol enables the following transactions:
* A principal delegates authority to an unprivileged principal
* A principal proves it has been delegated the authority to work on behalf of
another principal
* A service requests evidence that a client holds an authority
* A principal requests that authority be delegated to it
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Figure 3-1 depicts these different Delegation Protocol transaction at work. A
client sends a request to a deputy asking that an operation be performed via an
application protocol (step 1), causing the deputy in turn to make a request on behalf
of the client asking a service to perform an operation (step 2). The service does not
know whether the deputy is authorized to make its request, so it sends a Delegation
Protocol request for evidence that the deputy holds some authorities (step 3). The
deputy does not hold the authority, so deputy sends a Delegation Protocol request
asking the client to delegate it the authority required to work on the client's behalf
(step 4). The client, holding the required authority, delegates it to the deputy by
passing the deputy a delegation credential via the Delegation Protocol (step 5). The
deputy sends its delegation credential to the service via the Delegation Protocol to
prove that it holds the required authority (step 6). The service verifies the delegation
credential and, satisfied that the deputy now holds the required authority, responds
to its application protocol request (step 7). Upon receiving a response to the request
it performed on the client's behalf, the deputy responds to the client's request.
While the transactions enabled by the Delegation Protocol help the Delegation
Framework avoid modifying application protocols, using the Delegation Protocol de-
couples delegation credentials from the application protocol requests to which they
are intended to apply. The Delegation Protocol provides messages for negotiating
principals' authority to access services, but these credentials only bind authority to
identities and public keys. They provide no binding between a client's credentials
sent via the Delegation Protocol and the client's application protocol requests sent
via a separate channel. A mechanism must exist that binds a client's identity to
application protocol requests.
This binding problem could be solved by creating credentials that bind authority
directly to application protocol flows, but that is problematic because some clients will
employ multiple application protocol flows when accessing a service. For instance, web
browsers often open multiple connections to web servers when downloading content.
Credentials would have to bind authorities to each of these flows individually. When
authorizing a client to access a service, a user would have to include flow information
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Figure 3-2: A deputy acts on behalf of two clients when communicating via one
application protocol flow
in those credentials, requiring that new credentials be regenerated each time a client
initiates a new application protocol flow.
Binding authority directly to flows is also problematic because a deputy can send
application protocol requests via a single flow on behalf of multiple client principals.
Figure 3-2 illustrates a network application in which this occurs. A mailbox server
acts as a deputy by accessing a user's mailbox files stored on an underlying filesystem
service on the user's behalf. Different credentials should apply to the flow at different
times depending on whose behalf the deputy is accessing the underlying service (e.g.,
the deputy acts as "deputy for clientA" or "deputy for clientB" depending on which
client it serves at a given time).
Instead of binding authorities directly to flows, a client could send flow-to-identity
bindings via the Delegation Protocol. However, this would introduce significant net-
work overhead; being transmitted via separate channels, application protocol and
Delegation Protocol messages cannot be expected to arrive in a particular order.
Therefore, ensuring that a flow-to-identity binding was correct would require the
client to block its application protocol request until it received a confirmation that
its binding had been received by the service. In the network application depicted
in Figure 3-2, this could happen frequently due to the mailbox service acting as a
deputy.
3.2.2 The Speaks For Layer Protocol
The Speaks For Layer Protocol address the problem of mapping authorities onto the
flows to which they apply. Delegation credentials sent via the Delegation Protocol
Client
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Figure 3-3: The contents of a client's Speaks For Layer Protocol-encapsulated appli-
cation protocol flow
bind authority to identities (as is done with attribute certificates in SPKI/SDSI).
The Speaks For Layer Protocol provides the other piece of the puzzle, binding an
application protocol flow to the identity for which it speaks. The Speaks For Layer
Protocol is a protocol in which application protocol data is encapsulated by a client
before it is sent to a service. Normal application protocol data is sent wrapped
in a "Data" message. When necessary, the client may insert a SpeaksFor message
binding the flow to the identity for which the flow now speaks. The service receives
these bindings, remembering the most recently received flow-to-identity binding. The
service makes authorization decisions regarding individual application protocol access
requests based on the identity given in the most recently received SpeaksFor message.
Figure 3-3 depicts the contents of the Speaks For Layer Protocol messages that
a client sends to a service. The first message is a SpeaksFor message specifying that
subsequent application protocol messages speak for the identity Alice. The client
then sends two Speaks For Layer "Data" messages containing some application pro-
tocol request data. The service makes authorization decisions for these application
protocol requests by checking the authority held by Alice. Following the two "Data"
messages, the client sends sends another SpeaksFor message indicating that subse-
quent application protocol messages now speak for the identity Bob. The SpeaksFor
message is followed by two more "Data" messages containing application protocol,
for which the service makes authorization checks of authority held by Bob.
A client would not typically switch from speaking on behalf of one identity to
speaking on behalf of an entirely other identity as depicted in Figure 3-3. A client,
speaking on behalf of one user, will typically only send one SpeaksFor messages during
Service
the lifetime of a given application protocol flow. However, a deputy that constantly
switches between handling requests from multiple clients such as in Figure 3-2 will
send a SpeaksFor message each time it switches between sending requests on behalf
of one client to sending requests on behalf of another client (i.e., when the deputy
switches between its identity "deputy for clientA" and "deputy for clientB").
3.3 Framework Architecture
Delegation credentials are essential to realizing delegation in the Delegation Frame-
work and the proposed protocols facilitate deployment by avoiding application pro-
tocol modifications, but the problem remains that delegation credentials and the
Delegation Protocol and Speaks For Layer Protocol must be integrated with legacy
client and service programs. The Delegation Framework must be architected around
the needs of the legacy programs with which it is to be integrated.
Integrating support for handling delegation credentials and two new network pro-
tocols into a legacy client or service program is a considerable challenge for a devel-
oper. Legacy code may be a challenge to understand and integrating the Delegation
Framework may require an expensive and error-prone development process.
3.3.1 The Delegation Agent
Rather than require developers to port all the delegation functionality directly into
the legacy software, the Delegation Framework introduces an agent program, the
Delegation Agent, which performs much of the work of delegation on behalf of a
legacy program. Each legacy client and service is assisted by its own Delegation
Agent1 . Each Delegation Agent is assigned an identity, and a corresponding identity
certificate maps this identity to a public key. Using this identity and public key,
the Delegation Agent manages principal credentials, much like Taos' authentication
agent and OpenSSH's ssh-agent program, and speaks the Delegation Protocol on
'In legacy software implemented using multiple processes or threads., a single Delegation Agent
serves all of the processes or threads of a given client or service.
behalf of the legacy process it is assisting, eliminating the need for the legacy software
to understand the details of each of these tasks. Though the legacy program code
must be modified to interact with its Delegation Agent, the Delegation Framework's
agent-assisted design simplifies the task of integrating the Delegation Framework into
legacy code considerably.
In the interest of maintaining separate notions of the authorities assigned to users
and the authorities assigned to the clients they use, each user also maintains a separate
Delegation Agent that is distinct from the Delegation Agents of each of the client
programs he uses. When needed, a client program's Delegation Agent asks the user's
Delegation Agent to delegate authority the client requires to perform its function.
The user Delegation Agent provides a delegation user interface through which the
user decides whether to delegate authority to a client when a client makes such a
request.
3.3.2 The Delegation Framework Library
The Delegation Agent considerably reduces the amount of functionality that each
legacy program must support directly within its code, but nevertheless the legacy
code must be modified to support the Delegation Framework. The set of calls that
the legacy software must perform comprise the Delegation Framework Library. This
library provides calls to support the Delegation Agent's functions, calls to check
whether a client is properly authorized, and calls for communicating via the Speaks
For Layer Protocol.
In the interest of making modifications to legacy programs as easy as possible, the
interface of the Delegation Framework Library should be conducive to being imple-
mented using dynamic library interposition techniques [25, 15, 28]. For instance, a
considerable amount of information can be derived from the pattern of socket I/O op-
erations the legacy process performs. If the Delegation Framework Library interface
is designed appropriately, it will be possible to reroute socket I/O calls to alternate
implementations of the call that perform Delegation Framework Library calls without
requiring a programmer to modify the legacy program manually. If calls to the Del-
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Figure 3-4: The Delegation Framework architecture
egation Framework Library can be implemented successfully using dynamic library
interposition as a stub, it would considerably reduce the difficulty of integrating the
Delegation Framework into legacy software.
3.3.3 The Components Working in Concert
Figure 3-4 illustrates the interactions that occur in a Delegation Framework-enabled
network application between legacy processes, different instances of the Delegation
Framework Library, and Delegation Agents. The figure depicts three hosts on each
of which a client, deputy, and service program executes. An instance of the Del-
egation Framework Library resides within the memory of each legacy process. An
interposition stub, also resident within each legacy process's memory, performs the
appropriate Delegation Framework Library automatically for the legacy process when
it is able. Legacy programs communicate with one another using their normal ap-
plication protocol, but they encapsulate the application protocol data within Speaks
For Layer Protocol using calls in the Delegation Framework Library.
For each legacy program, there exists a Delegation Agent that manages the legacy
program's delegation credentials and communicates via the Delegation Protocol with
other Delegation Agents on behalf of the legacy program. The legacy program com-
municates with its Delegation Agent using its instance of the Delegation Framework
Library, which opens a communication channel with the local Delegation Agent via
an operating system-provided domain socket. In a legacy program involving multiple
threads or processes, there exists only one Delegation Agent, but each legacy thread
or process maintains its own separate communication channel with the Delegation
Agent.
In addition to a Delegation Agent working on behalf of each legacy program, there
exists a separate Delegation Agent working on behalf of each user. The user's Dele-
gation Agent communicates with the Delegation Agents of the legacy client programs
that the user uses. A delegation user interface, through which the user makes autho-
rization decisions, is attached to each user Delegation Agent. The user's Delegation
Agent and the corresponding delegation user interface may reside on the same host
as the user's client programs (as depicted in Figure 3-4) or, for added security, on a
separate host or portable hardware device as has been done in previous delegation
applications [26, 5].

Chapter 4
Delegation Credentials
Delegation credentials provide the mechanism by which one principal asserts that it
delegates authority to another principal. A delegate uses these assertions to prove its
authority when accessing a -service on behalf of the delegator. This chapter details
the structure of delegation credentials used in the Delegation Framework.
4.1 Delegation and Identity Certificates
The Delegation Framework employs two types of certificates: identity certificates
which allows a principal to assert mappings between an identity's name to public
key, and delegation certificates which allow a principal to assert a delegation of its
authority to another principal. These certificates are the building blocks of delegation
credentials.
4.1.1 Identity Certificates
Using an identity certificate, an issuer asserts that a subject holds a particular public
key for a specified period of time. An identity certificate contains the following fields:
* issuer - the name of the issuing identity
* subject - the name of the subject identity
* subjectlkey - the subject identity's public key
* notbefore - the time before which the certificate is not valid
* not.after - the time after which the certificate is not valid
In the prototype implementation of the Delegation Framework, the issuer iden-
tity for all identity certificates is a well-known, globally-trusted certificate author-
ity principal whose public key and name are stored on all participating hosts. This
amounts to a simple, single-tiered PKI system. The single-tiered PKI approach would
not effective for internet-wide deployments of the Delegation Framework. A real world
deployment should employ a true hierarchical PKI-based or other infrastructure for
mapping an identity's name to key, such as DNSSEC. Provided it can be successfully
deployed, DNSSEC servers have potential to be convenient places to store identity
certificate-like mappings; when a client looks up the IP address of a given service
with which it is about to initiate an application protocol stream, the query could also
return the identity certificates, or equivalent identity certificate-like mappings, for all
Delegation Framework-based services on the host.
The subject identity and the subjectlkey represent the name-to-key mapping
that the certificate provides. The not_before and not_after fields are timestamps
specifying the period of time during which the certificate is valid. The use of these
timestamps requires all hosts that are part in a given network application using the
Delegation Framework to maintain reasonably consistent clocks within a few seconds
of one another.
4.1.2 Delegation Certificates
Using a delegation certificate, an issuing delegator asserts that it grants a subject
delegate a set of authorities that the issuer presently holds or may hold at some time
during the delegation certificate's validity. A delegation certificate includes the same
fields as an identity certificate (thereby making it possible to include a name-to-key
mapping) along with one additional field:
* authpolicy - an authorization policy assertion specifying the delegated set of
authorities
As described in Section 3.1.2, the design of the Delegation Framework is not bound
to a particular authorization policy language. The Delegation Framework prototype
implementation uses the language described in Section 4.3.
A problem with relying exclusive on global name-to-key mapping infrastructure is
that they tend to produce mappings with long lifetimes. When a principal's private
key credential is compromised, the long-lived mappings between its name and public
key must be revoked and replaced with new mappings. To help deal with this issue,
delegation certificates include a subjectlkey field, allowing a principal to provide
an name-to-key mapping for the principal to whom it delegates authority, making
it possible to delegate authority to a temporary private key that does not have an
corresponding name-to-key mapping in the global PKI infrastructure, DNSSEC, or
whatever other name-to-key mapping mechanism that may be used.
Having the subjectlkey field in delegation certificates allows a deputy adminis-
trator to store the deputy's private key on a secure (perhaps offline) host separate
from the deputy's service-providing host, and regularly regenerate and push tem-
porary keys and short-lived delegation certificates to the online deputy host. The
authorization policy specified in these delegation certificates is of a special form that
allows the temporary keys to inherit all authority delegated to the globally-mapped
identity. However, in the event of a deputy's compromise (provided that the compro-
mise is discovered), the temporary credentials hijacked from the host only authorize
the authorities delegated to service for the window of time during which the hijacked
temporary credentials remain valid. Global identity-to-key mappings remain valid, al-
lowing the administrator to go to the trouble of having a certificate authority produce
a long-lived mapping to a new key pair.
The Delegation Framework implements certificates using the OpenSSL's X.509
and cryptographic library routines to construct, sign, and verify certificates. The
Delegation Framework is not bound to any particular public key algorithm or specific
parameters of that algorithm. Any secure public key algorithm with appropriately-
sized keys will suffice, and the OpenSSL library implements several. The Delegation
Framework prototype uses 2048-bit RSA keys.
4.2 Identity Names
The Delegation Framework uses strings with an email address-like naming format
to identify principals in the issuer and subject fields of identity and delegation
certificates. The following of some examples of the name format:
* alice@foo.anydomain. com
* mailbox@bar . somedomain. com
* filesystem@baz. otherdomain. com
* database@bang. otherdomain. com
Each principal in the Delegation Framework (be it a user, client, deputy, or service)
has an associated name assigned by its administrator.
Maintaining a strict mapping between the domain name specified in an identity
and the actual domain name of the host on which a principal's legacy software and
Delegation Agent processes reside. For example, users who may employ multiple
client machines or whose client machines are part of a DHCP pool in which domain
names can change. Additionally, a single service may be served by a dynamic pool of
hosts. Therefore, the Delegation Framework does not rely on a strict mapping being
a host's domain name and the one specified in an identity string. However, in the case
of services, it is useful to maintain this mapping because it will help users and clients
locate services identified by these strings. This would be particularly important in
deployment of the Delegation Framework where DNSSEC is used to map keys to
identities. As a guideline, a service principal's domain name specified in an identity
string should smallest domain in which the service can be expected to remain. User
and client Delegation Agents should be suspicious of services that do not follow this
guideline, and maintain a policy for dealing with them.
4.3 Authorization Policies
The Delegation Framework prototype supports a simple language for defining autho-
rization policies contained in delegation certificates. Authorization policy are specified
by strings of the following form:
* <identity>:<operation>:<subject>
The <identity> field is of the form described in Section 4.2. This identity defines
the principal of the service on which the operation and argument fields are relevant,
not the principal to whom the authority has been given (the holder of the defined au-
thority is specified within a delegation certificate). The <operation> and <subject>
fields specify the access operation attempting to be performed the subject object of
that operation. The precise contents of the <operation> and <subject> fields are
specific to the service for which the authorization policy applies.
Each of the individual fields may include a set definition, allowing an authorization
policy definition to specify multiple combinations of field values. A set definition is
represented either as a comma-separated list of string values or as a string with
an asterisk. An asterisk defines that an arbitrary length string may take its place.
Asterisks are only allowed as the last character of the <operation> and <subject>
fields. They are allowed in the <identity> field in two locations: the end of the string
preceding the '0' symbol, and the beginning of the string following the '@' symbol.
These restrictions on the location of the asterisk make it possible to compute the
intersection of two authorization policies using a simple tractable algorithm while
still providing a fairly descriptive authorization policy language.
The following are examples of authorization policies that might be employed in a
network file service:
1. filesystemrfoo .somedomain. com:*:/home/alice/*
2. filesystem@foo. somedomain. com :read: /home/alice/www/*
3. filesystem@*.somedomain.com:read,execute:/usr/bin/*
4. **:*:*
Example 1 specifies the authority to perform any operation on a file or directory
within the /home/alice file hierarchy. This defines the set of authority that the file
service would logically granted to the user alice@foo. somedomain. com to access her
own home directory.
Example 2 specifies the authorities required to read the web files of the principal
named alicef oo. somedomain. com.
Example 3 defines the authority to read and execute files and directories within
the /usr/bin directory of any service named filesystem on any host in the
somedomain. com domain name space. This is an example of authority that might
be delegated to users of a distributed computing environment. Programs of interest
can be maintained and made available by different sub-organizations within a given
administrative domain on their own file servers such as is common in MIT's Athena
system.
Example 4 defines the set of all authority. This defines the all-inclusive autho-
rization policy that may define the authorities a deputy's administrator delegates
to temporary online keys as described in Section 4.1 such that the temporary keys
inherit any authority delegated to the deputy's identity.
A production deployment of the Delegation Framework would likely require a
sophisticated authorization policy definition language, such as SAML or that provided
by Keynote. These language would provide more descriptive capabilities than our
scheme. The Delegation Framework prototype employs this simple scheme to allowing
for experimentation with the architecture of the framework without requiring the
prototype to implement a complex authorization policy language.
4.4 Credential Structure and Validity
Work on general purpose algorithm for distributed proving of authorization have
proven to be complex [6]. These algorithms often go beyond the needs of the Delega-
tion Framework. A simpler algorithm will suffice provided that clients and deputies
store the delegation credentials providing evidence of their authority, and that those
credentials are structured appropriately.
The Delegation Framework requires delegation credentials to adhere to a structure.
Each delegation credential includes two sequences of certificates: one consisting of
delegation certificates, and the other consisting of identity certificates. The ordering
of these sequences reflects the natural structure of the chain of delegation. The
name of the issuer of each delegation certificate must match the name of the subject
of the previous delegation certificate in the chain (no constraints are place on the
issuing identity of the first delegation certificate or the subject identity of the last
delegation certificate). The sequence of identity certificates must follow the same
ordering. The subject of the next identity certificate must match the issuer of the
next delegation certificate. This mapping requirement enables the credential verifier
to quickly determine the public key used to sign the delegation certificate. If the i'th
delegation certificate contains a non-empty subj ectlkey field, it provides the identity-
to-key mapping that the (i + 1)'th identity certificate would have if the subjectkey
field were empty. The (i + 1)'th position in the sequence of identity certificates is left
empty.
4.4.1 Credential Structure
Figure 4-1 illustrates the structure of credentials using an example constructed accord-
ing to the requirements of the Delegation Framework. Signature values are omitted
from the figure, but are normally contained in each certificate. The 1st identity cer-
tificate must always be included in the credential because there does not exist a dele-
gation certificates previous to the 1st delegation certificate in which an identity-to-key
mapping could be included. Delegation certificates 1 and 3 leave the subjectlkey
field empty, and consequently the 2nd and 4th identity certificates must be non-
empty. However, the 2nd delegation certificate includes a non-empty subjectkey
(highlighted in bold font in Figure 4-1), providing the mapping that would otherwise
be provided by the 3rd identity certificate.
i Delegation Certs Identity Certs
issuer=Alice issuer=CA
1 subject= Bob subject=Alice
subjectkey=0 subjectkey=1FB0...
notbefore= T1  not_before= T2
notafter=Ts not_after=T 9
authpolicy=A1
issuer-=Bob issuer=CA
2 subject=Charles subject=Bob
subject_key=7B42... subjectkey=4C25...
not_before=T3  notbefore=T4
not_after=T10o notafter-Tll
authpolicy=A2
issuer=Charles
3 subject=Diane
subjectkey= 0
notbefore=T5
not after=T12
authpolicy=A 3
issuer=Diane issuer=CA
4 subject=Edward subject=Diane
subjectkey=0 subjectkey=A289...
notbefore=T6  notbefore= T7
not_after=T13  notafter=T 14
auth_policy=A 4
Figure 4-1: A sample delegation credential in the Delegation Framework
4.4.2 Credential Validity
To be considered valid, the certificate chain in each delegation credential must adhere
to the following three constraints:
* The signature of each certificate must be valid
* The notbefore fields of all certificates must not be after the current time and
the notafter fields of all certificates must not be before the current time (the
temporal constraint)
* Each authority granted to the subject of a delegation credential must be spec-
ified in each the authpolicy specifications of each delegation certificate (the
spatial constraint)
The most basic of these is the constraint on signatures. For a delegation credential
to be considered valid, each of its certificates must be considered valid. Each identity
certificate must be validly signed by the key of the globally trusted certificate author-
ity principal. Each delegation certificate must be validly signed by the key that has
been mapped to the certificate's issuing identity, whether the key was derived from
an identity certificate or from a previous delegation certificate.
The temporal constraint is satisfied if every certificates is valid at the present
time. Therefore, the present time must be later in time the most recent time spec-
ified in the notbefore field values of all the certificates in the credential. Corre-
spondingly, the present time must be earlier than the earliest time specified in the
notafter field values of all the certificates in the credential. The Delegation Frame-
work uses a common representation for time: the integer number of seconds have
passed since an epoch. Therefore, determining the latest and earliest time values
from among a set of time values involves computing the maximum and minimum of
the integer time values, respectively. In the example depicted in Figure 4-1, the del-
egation credential is valid from the time max(T1 , T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7) until the time
min(Ts, T9, T1, T11, T12, T1 3, T14).
To satisfy the spatial constraint, every delegation certificates in the chain must
contain each of the authorized authorities and the original issuer must be known to
possess each of these authorities as well. Each access-controlled service (where the
credential is ultimately verified) maintains an access control list of the authority it
has granted to users of the service, the principals who will be the original delegators
of authority in any given credential.
Computing the set of authorities authorized by a delegation credential in order to
meet the spatial constraint is straightforward. As described in Section 3.1, the set of
authorities authorized by a delegation certificate is defined to be the intersection of the
authority known to be held by the issuer with the set of authorities defined within the
delegation certificate. In the example from Figure 4-1, the first delegation certificate
in the chain specifies that "Alice" delegates "Bob" the set of authorities A1 defined by
the authorization policy in the authpolicy field of the certificate. Therefore, if the
access control list on a given service to which a credential applies authorizes "Alice"
to use the set of authorities Ao, the actual set of authorities granted to "Bob" by the
first delegation certificate is Ao n A1. "Bob", holding the set of authority Ao n A1,
then re-delegates a subset of his authorities to "Charles" with the second delegation
certificate depicted in Figure 4-1. The authority held by "Charles" is the intersection
of the set of authorities held by "Bob" and the set of authorities A2 held specified by
the auth_policy field of the second delegation certificate. Consequently, "Charles"
is granted the set of authorities Ao n A1 n A 2. This pattern of intersection operations
continues through the remainder of the delegation credential, finally authorizing the
principal named "Edward for Diane for Charles for Bob Alice" with the set of
authorities Ao n A A2 nf A3 n A4.
4.4.3 Credential Verification
Verifying the validity of a proof is a matter of checking the ordering requirements
and other constraints on the proof. Having imposed restrictions ordering constraints
on the proofs in the Delegation Framework, it is possible to avoid complex proving
algorithms. Verifying Delegation Framework proofs requires only a single linear pass
over the sequences of delegation and identity certificates contained in a proof. Natu-
rally, the certificate signatures can be checked one at a time. The values required to
check the temporal and spatial constraints can be computed iteratively as the verifier
passes over each certificate.
The proof algorithm proceeds as follows. The algorithm first initializes values
Tnot.before to 0, and Totafter to infinity'. The algorithm must also initialize Apoof to
the authorization policy contained in the local access control list that describes the
authorities granted to the issuer of the first delegation certificate in the chain.
After initializing this state, the algorithm examines each of the certificates in the
proof. Assuming there are n delegation certificates (and thus n identity certificates),
for each value i from 1 to n a proof verification algorithm does the following:
1. If i'th identity certificate is non-empty:
(a) verify its signature. If invalid, report an invalid proof
(b) check that its subject matches the issuer of the i'th delegation certificate.
If they do not match, report an invalid proof
(c) Compute the maximum of Thor-before and the value contained in its not _bef ore
field , and assign the result to Tnot-before
(d) Compute the minimum of Tnotfter and the value contained in its not after
field , and assign the result to Tnotoafter
2. Verify the signature of the i'th delegation certificate using the public key de-
rived from the subjectkey field of the (i - 1)'th delegation certificate (if the
subjectkey field was non-empty), or the i'th identity certificate. If invalid,
report an invalid proof.
3. If i > 1, check that the issuer of the i'th delegation certificate matches the
subject of the (i - 1)'th delegation certificate. If they do not match, report an
1Under the epoch-based time representation, the time value 0 represents the earlier possible time
that can be represented using this convention, the epoch itself (12 AM January 1, 1970 on UNIX
systems) and time value infinity represents the latest possible time that can be represented (actually
limited by the number of bit used to store time values by the operating system).
invalid proof.
4. Compute the maximum of T,not_efore and the value contained in the notbefore
field of the i'th delegation certificate, and assign the result to Tnot-before
5. Compute the minimum of Tnotafter and the value contained in the notafter
field of the i'th delegation certificate, and assign the result to Tnot_-fter
6. Computer the intersection of Apoof and the authorization policy contained in
the i'th delegation certificate's authpolicy field, and assign the result to Aproof
After completing the n passes through this sequence of steps, Tnot-before and
Tnotafter will respectively contain the earliest time and latest time that the whole
proof is valid, and Aproof will contain the authorization policy describing the authori-
ties assigned to the subject of the last delegation certificate in the proof. If Tnotbefore
is greater than Tnotafter or if Aproof is the empty set, the proof should be considered
invalid2
2 These conditions can be checked after each of the n passes through the looping portion of the
algorithm in order to avoid wasting time in the case of an invalid proof.
Chapter 5
The Delegation and Speaks For
Layer Protocols
Application protocols cannot be assumed to support delegation of authority. The
conventional approach to including support for new security features in a protocol
is wrought with complications. Application protocol specifications are often drafted
by standards organizations, and achieving alteration to their specifications requires
a great deal of lengthy debate. Further, the adoption of new protocol specifications
requires each protocol implementation to be modified which can also be a length and
expensive process. The Delegation Framework is designed to avoids these complica-
tion by providing two novel protocols, the Delegation Protocol and Speaks For Layer
Protocol. These protocols allow the Delegation Framework to provide delegation of
authority in network applications without modification to the existing application
protocol specifications used in the network application.
5.1 Application Protocol Model
The Delegation Framework relies on some assumptions about the application proto-
cols to which it is being applied. Application protocols must adhere to the client-server
model. Application protocols associated with many important network applications
fit this model: HTTP, IMAP, database protocols, and NFS.
The typical order of events that occurs in the client-server model is that the
client host sends a request message via the application protocol to the server asking
that one or more specified operations be performed on one or more specified objects.
Upon receiving the request message, the server may make one or more authorization
decisions regarding each of the individual operations on each of the specified objects.
If the client is authorized, the server performs the requested operation and sends a
response message to the client via the application protocol with the result. If the
client is unauthorized, the server responds with a message indicating its denial of the
request.
In addition to adhering the client-server model, an additional assumption must
be made about the application protocol. The Speaks For Layer Protocol allows the
client to periodically "tag" an application protocol flow with SpeaksFor messages (see
Section 3.2.2). This SpeaksFor message applies to all application protocol messages
transmitted subsequent to it until the client tags the application protocol stream with
a new SpeaksFor message. If application protocol messages and SpeaksFor messages
are not delivered in order, it will be impossible for the server receiving them to con-
clusively determine the correct identity for which a particular application protocol
message speaks. To support the Speaks For Layer, the transport over which applica-
tion protocol messages are carried must be reliable and provide in-order delivery. For
practical purposes on the internet today, this means the application protocol must be
transported over TCP, though the design of the Delegation Framework is not bound
to TCP'.
The reliable, in-order delivery requirement eliminates the possibility of using UDP-
transport application protocols with the Delegation Framework, whether or not they
adhere to the client-server model. The NFS protocol is an example of a common appli-
cation protocol transported over UDP, and NFS-based services are a strong potential
target for a delegation-based authorization mechanism. Fortunately, implementations
1In recent years, a reliable, in-order transport protocol called Stream Control Transmission Pro-
tocol (SCTP) has been proposed as a more feature-rich substitute for TCP [27]. Though an exami-
nation using SCTP with the Delegation Framework is beyond the scope of this thesis, its probable
that SCTP would be a suitable transport for application protocols in the Delegation Framework.
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Figure 5-1: Delegation Framework protocol stack
of NFS that are transported over TCP exist, though the use of TCP versus UDP can
considerably affect the protocol's performance.
Peer-to-peer and group protocols may also benefit from the delegation authoriza-
tion paradigm, but may or may not function such that the Delegation Framework
can be integrated as it is presently designed and implemented. This thesis will not
consider the applicability of the Delegation Framework to these types of protocols.
5.2 Protocols Working Together
The Delegation Framework is able to achieve delegation across a network for a large
class of application protocols not by substituting a new protocol for the existing ap-
plication protocol, but rather by using the Delegation Protocol and Speaks For Layer
Protocol in conjunction with a given application protocol. Together, the protocols
form a meta-protocol, a version of the application protocol that supports the delega-
tion authorization mechanism. Figure 5-1 illustrates the organization of the protocol
stack that the Delegation Framework employs.
The Speaks For Layer Protocol (SFL) must be carried over a reliable, in-order
transport in order the SpeaksFor messages to be properly ordered with the applica-
tion protocol requests that they attach to specific identities (see Section 5.1). The
Delegation Protocol is used to pass potentially large delegation credentials (contain-
ing arbitrarily many delegation certificates), and so its messages are not guaranteed
to fit within a single maximum transmission unit specified for a given data link that
may lie between a client and service2 . To ensure that its large messages are received
2The maximum transmission unit by standard gigabit ethernet is 1500 bytes. A sequence of
properly, the Delegation Protocol must also be carried over a reliable, in-order trans-
port. Though it is not an express requirement of the design, the prototype Delegation
Framework implementation relies on TCP for reliable, in-order transport.
Further, the Delegation Protocol and Speaks For Layer Protocol must be car-
ried within an encrypted channel. The Delegation Protocol carries a considerable
amount of information regarding the authorities held by individual principals that
could be discovered by an eavesdropper, and the Speaks For Layer Protocol contains
authenticating information that could be leveraged by adversaries to abuse a princi-
pal's delegation credentials (described in further detail in Section 5.5). Encapsulating
both protocols in an encryption layer prevents most information leakage attacks.
The remainder of this chapter describes the facilities of the Delegation Protocol
and the Speaks For Layer Protocol, and details the meta-protocol they produce in
conjunction with a generic application protocol that adheres to the client-server model
(see Section 5.1).
5.3 Diagram Notation
The remainder of this chapter employs network protocol diagrams. Figure 5-2 is a
simple example of one such diagram. Each vertical bar in a given diagram corresponds
to a single principal participating in the protocol. These vertical bar are each labeled
with the principal's name or role in the protocol. The sloped lines of text between
the vertical bars represent protocol messages transmitted between the principals,
and and the corresponding arrows point toward the recipient principal's vertical bar.
The diagrams depict a temporal dimension, which advances downward such that
MessageTwo follows MessageOne in time in Figure 5-2.
identity certificate containing the 2048-bit (512-byte) public keys used in the Delegation Framework
can easily exceeds this capacity.
Alice Bob
1 MessageO
n e X , Y, Z
2 +- MessageTwo A, B, C
Figure 5-2: A generic protocol example
5.3.1 Protocol Messages
The particular protocol that a message is a part of is explicitly noted for clarity in
the network protocol diagrams.
Delegation Protocol messages are colored red and enclosed in square brackets as
follows:
* DP[ Message
Application protocol messages are colored blue and enclosed in square brackets as
follows:
* (pi) [ Request ]
* (p,i)[ Response ]
With regard to application protocol message notation, p specifies the application
protocol in which a message is communicated, and i specifies a particular session of
the application protocol p. For instance, messages as part of the 1st session of the
SMTP protocol would be denoted as (SMTP,1)[ .]. This notation allows diagrams to
distinguish between different sessions of the same protocol (i.e., (IMAP,i)[ . ] versus
(IMAP,j)[ . ]) and sessions of different protocols (i.e., (IMAP,i) [. J versus (POP,i)[ .]).
Speaks For Layer Protocol messages are colored green and enclosed in square
brackets as follows:
* SFL[ Messagei
5.4 Delegation Protocol Channel Setup
Before a legacy client process initiates an application protocol session with a service,
the client's Delegation Agent must first attempt to establish a Delegation Proto-
col channel with the service's Delegation Agent. This process indicates whether the
legacy service is Delegation Framework-enabled. If the client Delegation Agent deter-
mines that the service supports the Delegation Framework, then the client can encap-
sulate application protocol requests within Speaks For Layer Protocol messages. If the
service is not Delegation Framework-enabled, the legacy client process can transmit
application protocol requests without Speaks For Layer Protocol encapsulation.
5.4.1 Finding a Service's Delegation Agent
The Delegation Agent for each Delegation Framework-enabled legacy service run-
ning on a given host is expected to listen on a distinct port in order to prevent the
Delegation Agents of different services from colliding on a particular port. To avoid
port collisions in the Delegation Framework prototype, a legacy service's port number
maps to an arbitrary, but well-known, port number on which the service's Delegation
Agent listens. For instance, if the legacy service is a web server listening on port 80,
its Delegation Agent listens for Delegation Protocol connections on port 3489.
This approach is suitable for the Delegation Framework prototype, but the choice
of ports in the prototype's convention may collide with services offered on real world
hosts. Instead of relying on a convention that may still result in port conflicts,
real world deployments could use a service similar to RPC's portmapper. This
portmapper-like service would listen on a single well-known port, and would pro-
vide mappings between the ports of Delegation Framework-enabled services and the
ports on which those services' Delegation Agents listen.
5.4.2 Encrypted Channel Setup
Given that the service is Delegation Framework-enabled, the client Delegation Agent
opens a TCP connection to the service Delegation Agent via which the two Delegation
Agents will communicate using the Delegation Protocol. Immediately following the
channel setup, the two Delegation Agents negotiate a shared secret key and encrypt
all connection data with it. The specific key negotiation protocol and encryption
algorithm used are not important provided that they produce an encrypted channel
that is resilient to eavesdropping. Though a deployed Delegation Framework imple-
mentation should use an encrypted channel, the current prototype of the Delegation
Framework does not implement an encryption layer. Producing an encrypted channel
is a well understood problem and an implementation is non-essential to validating the
Delegation Framework design.
5.4.3 Mutual Authentication
After the two Delegation Agents have established an encrypted channel, they must
mutually authenticate one another. The mutual authentication protocol in which they
engage is a variation of the Needham-Schroeder public key mutual authentication
protocol [20] that is resilient to the Lowe attack [19] and has been proven to be
cryptographically sound [3]. The Needham-Schroeder protocol is structured such
that, following the successful completion of the protocol, each party is convinced that
its peer holds the public key it claims to hold. In the Delegation Framework variation
of the protocol, that key is also mapped to the peer's identity. This mapping is
provided by an identity certificate or a delegation delegation certificate with a non-
empty subjectlkey field (see Section 4.1). Finally, the peers also agree on a session
nonce that will be used later to authenticate Speaks For Layer Protocol messages.
The Delegation Protocol messages that compose this protocol are the Hello and
HelloResponse messages. During mutual authentication, each Delegation Agent sends
its peer a Hello message. With the Hello message, a Delegation Agent transmits its
identity certificate Cid or, if the principal is using a temporary key that does not have
an identity certificate, the identity certificate Cid of the principal on whose behalf
it is working. If the Delegation Agent is using a temporary key, It also transmits
a delegation certificate Ctemp that contains its temporary key and the authorization
policy defining the authorities delegated to the temporary key. The Hello messages
also contains a randomly-generated nonce N that the sending Delegation Agent signs
using it private key (whether its a long-term or temporary key), which is essential
for the Needham-Schroeder protocol. Protocol diagrams denote the Hello messages
as follows:
* Hello Cid, Q•emp, {yI}pK
In order to correctly perform mutual authentication under Needham-Schroeder,
each peer must respond to the Hello message it receives with a HelloResponse message
containing the nonce that it received from its peer, this time signing the nonce with
its own private key. Protocol diagrams denote the HelloResponse message as follows:
* HelloResp {N}pK<
Figure 5-3 depicts the Delegation Protocol channel setup dialogue. All together,
the steps of this dialogue are as follows:
1. The client Delegation Agent transmits a Hello message containing the iden-
tity certificate Cid,li containing the permanent identity-to-key mapping for the
principal on whose behalf its temporary principal operates, and the delegation
certificate Ctemp,ci which authorizes the temporary principal and provides its
identity-to-key mapping. The client includes the randomly generated nonce NI
in the message signed in this case with a temporary private key PKtemp,di. The
service Delegation Agent verifies the signatures on both certificates and the
nonce, and closes the Delegation Protocol connection if any signature is invalid.
2. The service Delegation Agent transmits a Hello message containing the iden-
tity certificate Cid,srv containing the permanent identity-to-key mapping for the
principal on whose behalf its temporary principal operates, and the delegation
certificate Ctemp,r,, which authorizes the temporary principal and provides its
identity-to-key mapping. The service includes the randomly generated nonce
N2 in the message signed in this case with a temporary private key PKtemp,srv.
The client Delegation Agent verifies the signatures on both certificates and the
nonce, and closes the Delegation Protocol connection if any signature is invalid.
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Figure 5-3: The Delegation Protocol channel setup dialogue
3. After receiving the service Delegation Agent's Hello message in step 2, the client
Delegation Agent extracts the nonce N2 and signs the nonce using its temporary
private key PKtemp,di, marshalls the signed nonce into a HelloResponse message,
and transmits the message to the service Delegation Agent. Upon receiving the
HelloResponse message, the service Delegation agent extracts the signed nonce
{N2}PKtemp,cCi and uses the temporary public key contained in Ctemp,cli to verify
the signature on the encrypted nonce. If the signature is valid, the service
considers the client to be authenticated. If the signature is invalid, the service
Delegation Agent closes the Delegation Protocol connection.
4. After receiving the client Delegation Agent's Hello message in step 1, the service
Delegation Agent extracts the nonce N1 and signs the nonce using its temporary
private key PKtemp,sv, marshalls the signed nonce into a HelloResponse mes-
sage, and transmits the message to the client Delegation Agent. Upon receiv-
ing the HelloResponse message, the client Delegation agent extracts the signed
nonce {N1}PKtemp,Srv and uses the temporary public key contained in Ctemp,srv to
verify the signature on the encrypted nonce. If the signature is valid, the client
Delegation Agent considers the service to be authenticated. If the signature is
invalid, the client Delegation Agent closes the Delegation Protocol connection.
After the client and service have authenticated one another, each peer remembers
the nonce N1 sent by the service. N2 becomes the session nonce, which is used later
to authenticate SpeaksFor messages.
The messages in steps 1 and 2 may be exchanged in any order, but will always
precede the messages in steps 3 and 4. Steps 3 and 4 may also be exchanged in any
order, but will always follow the messages in steps 1 and 2. Once the channel setup
dialogue is completed, each Delegation Agent is prepared to exchange Delegation Pro-
tocol messages with one another as described through the remainder of this chapter.
Network protocol diagrams throughout the remainder of this chapter will denote an
instance of the dialogue shown in Figure 5-3 as follows:
* DP[ Setup ] --+
Following the Delegation Protocol connection setup, the client will complete the
intended application protocol connection setup, performing whatever session negoti-
ation that the application protocol requires of the legacy client and service processes.
This may amount to nothing more than a TCP handshake, or it may involve the
authentication of a client by a standard mechanism such as a password or challenge-
response protocol and the negotiation of a number of session parameters. Whatever
the exchange entails, the data is exchanged is encapsulated in the Speaks For Layer
Protocol.
5.5 The Speaks For Layer
The Speaks For Layer's role is to provide mappings between identities and applica-
tion protocol flows. All application protocol requests must be mapped to an identity
so that the requesting client's authorities can be properly to application protocol re-
quests. These mappings state that an application protocol flow SpeaksFor a given
identity. Authorities provides by delegation credentials for the given identity subse-
quently apply to the requests transmitted via the application protocol flow. Without
proper identity-to-flow mappings, it is impossible for a service to properly authorize
any application protocol requests.
The Speaks For Layer Protocol (SFL) is a simple protocol used by a client to
mark its application protocol flows with information identifying on whose behalf ap-
plication protocol messages speak. SFL is not a modification to application protocols
themselves, but an additional protocol stack layer inserted above TCP and an encap-
sulating encryption layer and below the application protocol as depicted in Figure
5-1. These tags are only included by clients; a service does encapsulate the data it
transmits to clients within SFL messages; clients in the Delegation Framework do not
attempt to authorize the responses that they receive from services and therefore do
not require that each application protocol response by tagged with SpeaksFor infor-
mation. Thus, the Speaks For Layer Protocol only applies to the client-transmitted
half of the flow. Services transmit application protocol data as it normally would
without any SFL encapsulation.
Figure 5-4 depicts a series of messages transmitted via the Speaks For Layer Pro-
tocol. With message 1, a SpeaksFor message, the client informs the service that
subsequent application protocol requests speak for the principal "Alice for Charles".
The client includes the session nonce N,. The legacy service process receiving this
SpeaksFor message reports its contents to its local Delegation Agent which verifies
that N, is the correct session nonce. If the session nonce is incorrect, the service
will deny any subsequent requests from the client. The client then transmits an ar-
bitrary application protocol request in message 2 within an SFL "Data" message,
which identifies the request as application protocol data. If the service performs an
authorization check following the reception of message 2, it will evaluate the request's
authority with respect to the principal identified in the most recent SpeaksFor mes-
sage, "Alice for Charles". Message 3 is the service's application protocol response,
transmitted normally without being encapsulated in the Speaks For Layer Protocol.
Message 4 through 6 repeat the protocol, but this time around the client informs
the service that it speaks for the principal "Alice for David". Again, the service
Delegation Agent will verify that N, is the correct session nonce, and any subsequent
authorization checks that occur following message 5 are evaluated with respect to the
newly specified principal "Alice for David".
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Figure 5-4: A Speaks For Layer session
5.5.1 Authenticating SpeaksFor Messages
A SpeaksFor message contains a session nonce because the SpeaksFor message cannot
be authenticated exclusively based on knowledge of the host from which it were
received. The Delegation Framework allows multiple client principals (e.g., a mail
client and a web browser) to exist on a single host, each having separate identities
and having obtained different delegation credentials from their respective user(s). If
multiple client principals on a single host are communicating with a single legacy
service, the legacy service cannot determine whether an application protocol flow
actually speaks for a given client principal using only the identity contained in a
SpeaksFor message. If they did, a malicious client could claim one of its flows speaks
for another client principal on the same host.
Therefore, each SpeaksFor message contains the session nonce, N,, negotiated
between a given client and service Delegation Agent during the Delegation Protocol
channel setup. The client Delegation Agent can pass the appropriate session nonce
for a given service to a legacy client process when the legacy client process reports
that it is initiating a new application protocol session. With the correct session nonce
in hand, the legacy client process can include it in subsequent SpeaksFor messages
sent via the application protocol flow. The receiving legacy service process passes the
SpeaksFor message to its Delegation Agent so that subsequent authorization checks
can be made with respect to the correct client identity, giving the Delegation Agent
the opportunity to check the session nonce as well.
5.6 Protocols in Two-level Transactions
When a legacy service process receives an application protocol request from a client,
it performs an authorization check by making one or more reference monitor calls into
its Delegation Agent, passing the Delegation Agent an authorization policy definition
describing the authority that the client issuing the request must hold in order to have
the request honored. If the service Delegation Agent does not know whether the iden-
tity for whom the request speaks holds the required authority, the Delegation Agent
sends the a Delegation Protocol RequireAuthority message to the client's Delegation
Agent. The RequireAuthority message specifies the authorization policy A defining
the authority required, and the identity ID for whom the application protocol mes-
sage in question speaks (the identity that must be proven to hold the authority).
The RequireAuthority message also contains a nonce N. A later message includes
this nonce to identify itself as response to the RequireAuthority message. Network
protocol diagrams denote the RequireAuthority message as follows:
* ReqAuth A, ID, N
Upon receiving a RequireAuthority message, the client's Delegation Agent checks
its local knowledge of the authority it holds. If it holds the authority set A and can
present a corresponding credential providing evidence that it holds the authority, it
presents this credential to the service Delegation Agent using a DemonstrateAuthor-
ity message. A DemonstrateAuthority message contains a delegation credential C
providing evidence that ID holds the authority set A required by the service. The
DemonstrateAuthority message contains the value of the nonce N included in the
RequireAuthority message to which it responds. The DemonstrateAuthority message
need not contain explicit references to A or ID as this will be apparent to the service
Delegation Agent upon examining N. The credential C, if valid, will also contain in-
formation about ID and A. Upon receiving the Demonstrate Authority message, the
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Figure 5-5: A client-service dialogue in the Delegation Framework.
service Delegation Agent verifies the credential according to the algorithm described
in Section 4.4. If the credential is valid and does in fact show that ID holds the au-
thority set A, the service Delegation Agent informs the legacy service process that the
request is authorized. Network protocol diagrams denote the DemonstrateAuthority
message as follows:
* DemoAuth C, N
Figure 5-5 depicts the RequireAuthority and DemonstrateAuthority as they fit
into a dialogue between a client and a service. The steps that take place in this
dialogue are as follows:
1. The legacy client process is about to initiate a TCP connection to legacy ser-
vice process over which they will communicate using an application protocol.
Before allowing the connection to be initiated, legacy client process informs its
Delegation Agent of its intentions to open an application protocol connection.
If a Delegation Protocol channel has not already been established between the
client and service, the client's Delegation Agent establishes a TCP connection
to the service's Delegation Agent over which they will communicate via the
Delegation Protocol. The Delegation Agents engage in a setup dialogue (see
Section 5.4).
2. The legacy client process initiates the application protocol TCP connection.
Client Service
3. Immediately following the completion of the application protocol connection's
TCP handshake, the legacy client process informs the service of the principal for
which the application protocol flow speaks. The legacy service process receives
the SpeaksFor message and reports that the identity of the principal for whom
the application protocol flow speaks to its local Delegation Agent.
4. The legacy client process sends a Speaks For Layer-encapsulated application
protocol request.
5. Upon receiving the application protocol request, the legacy service process
makes a reference monitor call into its Delegation Agent specifying the author-
ity needed that the client must demonstrate in order to its request serviced.
The Delegation Agent finds that it has no evidence that the principal for whom
the application protocol request speaks (as identified by the SpeaksFor message
received in step 3) possesses the required authority, and consequently sends the
client's Delegation Agent a RequireAuthority message specifying the authority
set A1 that the principal must demonstrate.
6. Upon receiving the RequireAuthority message, the client examines the delega-
tion credentials that it holds to determine whether any of them provide him
with the authority set A1. If any of the credentials the client holds do pro-
vide the client principal with A1, the principal will marshall that credential
C1 into a DemonstrateAuthority message and send it to the service Delega-
tion Agent. Otherwise, the client's Delegation Agent will send a request to the
user's Delegation Agent asking whether to delegate it the required authority.
The dialogue with the user's Delegation Agent is described in Section 5.7. If the
user delegates the authority set A1 to the client, it provides the client Delega-
tion Agent the credential C1 . The client Delegation Agent marshalls C1 into a
DemonstrateAuthority message and sends the message to the service Delegation
Agent.
7. Upon receiving the DemonstrateAuthority message, the service's Delegation
Agent verifies the credential C1. If C1 is valid, it proves that the The Delega-
tion Agent responds to the service software's reference monitor call, indicating
whether the the client holds the required authority (i.e., whether the credential
C1 is valid and the set of authorities A2 proven to be held by the client contains
A1 as a subset). Given that the reference monitor call returns affirmatively, the
service software handles the application protocol message as it would normally
prior to the introduction of the Delegation Framework.
5.6.1 When a Client is Unable to Demonstrate Authority
If the client does not hold and cannot obtain delegation credentials from the user
providing the client with authority set A1, the client responds with a NoAuthority
message. This message appears in the dialogue depicted in Figure 5-5 at step 6. The
NoAuthority message contains only the nonce N indicating the RequireAuthority
message to which the NoAuthority message is being sent in response:
* NoAuth N
The service receives the NoAuthority message, checks the nonce and responds to
the legacy service process's corresponding reference monitor call indicating the client
principal's lack of authority. The application protocol response sent by the legacy
service process in step 7 indicates a failure due to lack of client authority.
5.7 Requesting Credentials from the User
If a legacy client program requires some authority that it does not hold, it must have
a mechanism by which it may request the required authority from its user. Between
steps 6 and 7 in the dialogue depicted in Figure 5-5, such a request may occur. The
client Delegation Agent engages in a dialogue with the Delegation Agent of the client's
user, asking the user to delegate the client some authority. This dialogue looks sim-
ilar to the RequireAuthority-DemonstrateAuthority exchange, expect now the client
requests a delegation of authority rather than a demonstration. The client Delegation
Agent sends a RequireDelegation message requesting that the user Delegation Agent
with identity ID delegate it authority set A. Like the RequireAuthority message, the
RequireDelegation message includes a nonce N that a user Delegation Agent message
will include to indicate it is a response to the RequireDelegation message. Network
protocol diagrams denote the RequireDelegation message as follows:
* ReqDel A, ID, N
The Delegation Protocol channel through which this dialogue occurs is initiated
by the user Delegation Agent prior to the user actually interacting with a given Del-
egation Framework-enabled client program. Just like a client initiating an exchange
with a service, the user Delegation Agent initiated a Delegation Protocol channel and
engaged in the Delegation Protocol channel setup dialogue described in Section 5.4.
This Delegation Protocol channel is a available for the client Delegation Agent to
transmit the RequireDelegation message to the user Delegation Agent.
Upon receiving the RequireDelegation, the user Delegation Agent determines
whether the user holds the requested authority and, if the user does, will prompt
the user asking whether to delegate the requested authority. If the user refuses, the
user Delegation Agent sends a NoAuthority message containing N back to the client
Delegation Agent. if the user wishes to the delegate the authority, the user Del-
egation Agent generates a delegation certificate providing the client principal with
the required authority set and constructs a credential from the delegation certificate.
The user Delegation Agent marshalls this credential C and the nonce N from the Re-
quireDelegation message to which the Delegation Agent is responding into a Delegate
message and sends the message to the client Delegation Agent. Network protocol
diagrams denote the Delegate message as follows:
* Delegate C, N
Figure 5-6 depicts the simple exchange between the user and client Delegation
Agents that would occur between steps 6 and 7 of the dialogue depicted in Figure
5-5 if the client did not already hold delegation credentials proving its authority.
User Client
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Figure 5-6: A user-client dialogue in the Delegation Framework
Upon completion of the dialogue, the client Delegation Agent holds the delegation
credential P1 proving its authority.
5.8 Protocols in Three-level Transactions
Clients are not the only principals that may require authority to be delegated to
them, and users are not the only principals who may delegate their authority. If a
client employs a deputy to access an underlying service on its behalf (e.g., a web
browser employs a deputy web service to access an underlying database service), it
may be necessary for the client to delegate some authority that it has received from
its user to a deputy. Doing this does not require any additional messages that the
Delegation Protocol does not already provide; the RequireDelegation, Delegate, and
NoAuthority messages can be reused in a dialogue between the client and deputy.
The dialogue depicted in Figure 5-7 is an expansion around the client-service
dialogue depicts in Figure 5-5. In this dialogue, the deputy principal takes up the
role that the client had in Figure 5-5.
The first five steps of the dialogue in Figure 5-7 are identical to the first five steps
of the dialogue which takes place in Figure 5-5. Instead of performing a reference
monitor call after step 5, the legacy deputy process initiates a client application
protocol flow of its own in order to service the client's request. In order to initiate
the application protocol flow, the deputy takes the role of the client in Figure 5-5,
and the same dialogue occurs between the deputy and service. After receiving the
RequireAuthority message in step 9, the deputy sends a RequireDelegation message
to the client if it does not hold the authority required to make the request sent in
step 8.
a o 00 •c, urC(O~ I0J
O1
I
,"-
T iT
Cr
(32CCX,
Ci-)a,
%a
1'
CI ,
Cl) Ci)
I ~
77
77
(.1
.5
a
0,
I
T
·1'~
a I
0,
q
a)
S
cd
ai)
a)
0a)
4
a)
7)0
4-Da)
7.1
a)
-Lb
-44A
.,...i
T
CIC
4-:
~-4 z
i·
If the client does not hold the authority it has been asked to delegate, the client
handles the RequireDelegation in step 10 by engaging a dialogue such as that in Figure
5-6 before it can send the Delegate message in step 11. Once the client Delegation
Agent holds the authority it must delegate to the deputy, the client Delegation Agent
generates a delegation certificate and crafts a delegation credential for the deputy
using this delegation certificate and the delegation credential proving the client's
authority. This is done by appending the new delegation certificate to the end of
his own delegation credential. The client Delegation Agent sends a Delegate message
containing this new delegation credential to the deputy in step 11. Like step 6 in
Figure 5-5, the deputy passes this delegation credential to the service in step 12 to
prove that it holds the needed authority. In step 13, the service Delegation Agent
returns an affirmative response to the legacy service process's reference monitor call
following step 12 that causes the legacy service process to handle the deputy's request
in step 13. Upon receiving a response to its application protocol request in step 13,
the deputy is now able to handle the client's request. The deputy sends its application
protocol response in step 14.
5.9 A Priori Delegation and Demonstration
If a client knows what authority it must delegate to a deputy or demonstrate to a
service before initiating a transaction, it is possible to reduce the request's latency.
Figure 5-8 depicts a dialogue similar to that which occurs in Figure 5-7, in which
the client and deputy delegate and demonstrate their authority prior to sending their
application protocol requests. If a client or deputy had a mechanism for remembering
which authority was needed to make a given application protocol request, this could
significantly reduces the delay incurred in transaction by avoiding the RequireDele-
gate and RequireDemonstrate messages altogether. The service software's reference
monitor call into the Delegation Agent following step 12 returns affirmatively instead
of causing the Delegation Agent to send a RequireDemonstrate message to the deputy.
The deputy need not send a RequireDelegate message since it received the needed
authority during step 4 and demonstrated that authority in step 9 before sending its
application protocol request in step 10.
The Delegation Framework prototype does not presently implement such a mech-
anism. In practice, it is difficult to know what authority a given application protocol
request will require. An examination of methods for ascertaining this information in
support of a priori delegation and demonstration is beyond the scope of this thesis.
5.10 Protocols in n-level Transactions
As an extension to the protocols depicted in Figures 5-7 and 5-8, the Delegation
Framework supports an arbitrary number of deputies in between the leftmost client
and the rightmost service in a given transaction. Passing of credentials from the
leftmost client to the rightmost deputy would involve additional exchanges of Re-
quireDelegation and Delegation messages.
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Chapter 6
The Delegation Agent
The Delegation Agent performs a couple of different functions depending what type
of software that it is assisting. When assisting a user or client principal, it acts as
a credential manager demonstrating and delegating authority in much the same way
that OpenSSH's ssh-agent manages credentials for ssh clients [22]. When assisting a
service process, the Delegation Agent acts as a reference monitor into which a service
processes make calls to check whether a client holds some required authority. When
assisting a deputy (i.e., a service that may act as a client when communicating with
an underlying service on behalf of its own clients), the Delegation Agent performs
both of these roles.
One instance of the Delegation Agent is run for each user and each client or service
in a Delegation Framework-enabled network application. A process communicates
with its Delegation Agent when the process:
1. Initiates a new outgoing application protocol flow (clients and deputies only)
2. Changes an identity-to-application protocol flow mapping (deputies only)
3. Closes an application protocol flow
4. Receives a SpeaksFor message from a client (services only)
5. Receives a request that requires authorization (services only)
Much of the interaction between a client or service process and its Delegation
Agent takes place so that Speaks For Layer Protocol messages properly identify the
principal on whose behalf each application protocol speaks. A Delegation Agent must
be capable of handling all of these interactions with the legacy client or service on
whose behalf it operates while the client or service is interacting with any number
of peers in a Delegation Framework-enabled system. I will later describe how legacy
processes can be made to interact with the Delegation Agent automatically in Chapter
7.
6.1 Delegation Agent architecture
The Delegation Agent is an event-driven program implemented using a select()-
based event loop. It is activated by Delegation Framework Library calls from from the
local process it assists, and other Delegation Agents. Each type of event corresponds
to a different type of message received by the Delegation Agent, and each message
has an associated handling routine to which the Delegation Agent dispatches in order
to properly handle the message.
The Delegation Framework specifies that each instance of a service or client on
a given host should have its own identity and, correspondingly, its own Delegation
Agent. However, due to the multiple-process and multi-threaded architecture of many
client and service processes, a single Delegation Framework principal may have mul-
tiple processes with which it must communicate. Each of these process with which a
Delegation Agent communicates maintains a separate UNIX domain socket with the
Delegation Agent.
Each Delegation Agent maintains an instance of each of the data structures listed
in 6.1. These data structures are introduced at appropriate times throughout the
discussion of this chapter.
Structure Key Value
peerdasock.map IDpeer peerdaf fd
peer-id.map peerdaf d IDpeer
peer..nonce-map IDpeer Ns,peer
flow.parentmap f lOWhild flOWparent
clientspeaksformap flow IDcDient
pending resp.map Nreq (resptype, resp_f d, Aresp, IDresp, Nresp)
known-authority-map ID {P 0, P1, ..., Pn}
Table 6.1: The Delegation Agent data structures
6.2 Handling Events
6.2.1 Handling a Legacy Client's New Connection Report
Section 5.6 discusses the steps taken between a client and service in a two-level trans-
action. Immediately after the legacy client process initiates a new application protocol
channel in the first step of the transaction, the legacy client calls into its Delegation
Agent to report the new application protocol TCP flow's flow identifier, a 4-tuple
identifier comprised of the four pieces of information that uniquely the flow by its
endpoints: (client IP, client port, service IP, service port).
Maintaining Peer Authentication Knowledge
If the client's Delegation Agent has not already opened a Delegation Protocol channel
with the Delegation Agent of the service to which the client is connecting, it initiates
a new Delegation Protocol connection to the service's Delegation Agent.
During the Delegation Protocol channel setup dialogue, each of the Delegation
Agents learns the identity and public key of its peer, along with a session nonce
which each must remember for the duration of the Delegation Protocol session. Each
Delegation Agent inserts an entries into three separate data structures containing
information about the session nonce, and identity and public key of the peer Del-
egation Agent. A Delegation Agent inserts an entry in the peer.nonce.map data
structure, mapping the peer name to the session nonce of the Delegation Protocol
session between the two peers. The Delegation Agent also inserts an entry in the
peerda_sock_map data structure, mapping the name of the peer identity to the TCP
socket descriptor of the Delegation Protocol channel that connects the local Dele-
gation Agent to the peer Delegation Agent. Finally, the Delegation Agent inserts
an entry in the peer_idnmap data structure, mapping the Delegation Protocol socket
descriptor to a pairing of the identity and key of the peer Delegation Agent. These
entries become useful later for identifying the proper descriptor of the socket via
which a particular Delegation Protocol message should be sent, and for determining
the identity of Delegation Protocol peer who sent a message that was received via a
particular socket.
Determining the Correct "Speaks For" Identity
Following the Delegation Protocol channel setup, the client must sends a message
through the application protocol TCP flow that it just setup. After completing the
mutual authentication protocol, the client's Delegation Agent determines the proper
identity for which the application protocol request presently speaks, and sends the
identity and the session nonce to the legacy client as the response to the new con-
nection report that caused the Delegation Agent to setup the Delegation Protocol
session. In a two-level transaction (such as that discussed in Section 5.6), the identity
for which the application protocol is of the form "client for user" where client is the
name of the principal on whose behalf the Delegation Agent is working, and user is
the name of the user principal currently using the client principal.
The Correct "Speaks For" Identity in a Three-Level Transaction
However, if the new application protocol connection is reported by a deputy in a
three-level transaction (see Section 5.8), the correct identity is that of the deputy
speaking on behalf of its client (who is in turn speaking on a user's behalf): "deputy
for client for user". Correctly reporting the deputy's identity requires knowledge of
the principal on whose behalf the new application protocol is initiated. This cannot
be determined with the 4-tuple of the newly setup application protocol flow alone;
the legacy deputy's report of the application protocol flow must also contain the flow
identifier of the flow from which it read the application protocol request on whose
behalf the new flow is being setup.
Using this additional flow identifier, the Delegation Agent can lookup the identity
of the deputy's "client for user" principal in a data structure called the
clientspeaksfor-map, which maps a serivce's client application protocol flows to
the identities for which they speak. A service (including deputy services) populates
its Delegation Agent's clientspeaksfor-map by reporting when it has received a
message to the Delegation Agent. In the case of a three-level transaction, the entry,
for an application protocol flow connecting a client to the deputy initiating the new
application protocol flow, will contain a principal identity of the form "client for
user".
Remembering a Child Flow's Parent
Later, the deputy must be able to determine to whom it should send a RequireDelega-
tion message upon receiving a RequireDemonstration or RequireDelegation message
from a service. To support this, a deputy's Delegation Agent must maintain knowl-
edge of the mapping between each outgoing application protocol flow that the deputy
has initiated on behalf of a client, the child flow, and the incoming client flow on
whose behalf the child flow was initiated, the parent flow. The Delegation Agent
maps child flows to parent flows using the flowparent-map data structure.
Returning to the Legacy Client or Deputy
Now that the client or deputy Delegation Agent has determined the identity of the
principal for which the new application protocol flow speaks, it returns the identity
to the legacy client or deputy process for inclusion in a message along with the
corresponding session nonce determined from the peer-noncemap data structure.
The legacy client or deputy process sends this information via a message (see Section
5.5).
Speaks for "clentA for userKA
Spoke for deputyA for dientAfor userAi
Speaks for "cilentB for userB'
Figure 6-1: A deputy switches from working on behalf of one client to working on
behalf of another
6.2.2 Handling a New Parent-Child Relationship
When a deputy legacy process is working on behalf of multiple clients, it is possible
that it may send client requests to an underlying service for multiple clients via a
single application protocol flow. The identity of the application protocol flow to the
underlying service must change when a deputy switches from working on behalf of
one client to working on behalf of another client.
Figure 6-1 illustrates a network application with this problem. deputyA switches
from working on behalf of clientA to working on behalf of clientB. The application
protocol flow via which it communicates with serviceA much now speak on behalf of
the new deputy identity "deputyA for clientB for userB". In abstract terms, this
may appear to be a contrived case, but this sort of configuration is not improbable in
real world systems. For example, deputyA might be a web front-end interface to an
IMAP service deputyB that accesses mailbox files on serviceA and e-mail directory
entries on serviceB on a user's behalf.
The deputy process must report to its Delegation Agent when such a change
occurs, passing the Delegation Agent the child flow identifier and the identifier of the
parent flow on behalf of which the child flow is being used. The Delegation Agent
handles this change much as it would a new application protocol flow connection
(see Section 6.2.1). The Delegation Agent need not setup a new Delegation Protocol
session because one already exists. However, the Delegation Agent must determine
Speaks for "dle for uswerA Spoke for"deauk B for deDouA fordetA for userA
Speaks for'den t for user' Speaks for ldeputyB for deputyA for dientB for useJ "
Figure 6-2: A network application requiring the forwarding of messages
the correct identity for which the child flow now speaks by looking up the parent flow
identifier in the clientspeaks_formap data structure, enter the new child-parent
relationship in the flowparent-map, and return the new identity for whom the child
flow speaks and the corresponding session nonce from peer-nonce-map for inclusion
in the legacy deputy process's message.
6.2.3 Handling a "Speaks For" Report
Upon receiving a message, a legacy service reports the message's contents to its
Delegation Agent. The Delegation Agent populates its
clientspeaksformap data structure using the reports. These reports include the
session nonce identity contained in the message, the flow identifier of the application
protocol TCP flow from which the message was received. The Delegation Agent looks
up the session nonce stored in its peernonce-map using the identity contained in the
message. If the peernonce~map value does not match that in the message, it rejects
the "Speaks For" mapping. This prevents the client from having its application
protocol request authorized using any principal's delegation credentials. If the nonce
values match, the Delegation Agent inserts an entry mapping the application protocol
flow identifier to the identity of the principal for which the application protocol flow
speaks into the clientspeaks-for-map.
Forwarding "Speaks For" Information
If the service receiving a "Speaks For" report is a deputy, there may exist flows which
are the children of the flow for which a new "Speaks For" identity has been specified.
This means the identities of each child flow have changed as well. For instance,
Figure 6-2 illustrates a network application which such a situation might occur. A
deputy, deputyB, may receive a "Speaks For" report regarding a parent flow, which
previously spoke for principal "deputyA for clientA for userA", declaring that the
parent flow now speaks for "deputyA for clientB for userB". The parent's child
flows that spoke for "deputyB for deputyA for dientA for userA" now speak for
"deputyB for deputyA for clientB for userB". The deputyB Delegation Agent
returns this identity to the deputy legacy process, which must send messages via each
of the parent's child application protocol flows'.
6.2.4 Handling a Reference Monitor Call
When a service process makes a reference monitor call into its Delegation Agent asking
whether a given application protocol flow's principal satisfies some authorization pol-
icy, the Delegation Agent begins handling the reference monitor call by looking up the
identity of the principal for whom the request speaks in the client_speaksf or.map.
Given this identity, the Delegation Agent looks up the credentials of the identified
principal in the known_authority-map data structure, which maps a principal's iden-
tity to the set of valid delegation credentials that the Delegation Agent has verified
for the principal. The Delegation Agent examines the principal's credentials to deter-
mine whether any of them prove that the principal satisfies the authorization policy
required by legacy service process's reference monitor call.
If the principal's knownauthority-map entry contains a credential satisfying the
reference monitor call's authorization policy, the Delegation Agent sends an affirma-
tive response back to the legacy service process. If the principal's known_authoritymap
entry does not contain credentials satisfying the reference monitor call, it sends a Re-
'The task of remembering a given flow's children is left to the legacy deputy and implemented
with dynamic library interposition techniques (see Chapter 7).
Client Host Deputy Host
Figure 6-3: The chain of Require* messages and corresponding responses
quireDemonstration to the client's Delegation Agent. The Delegation Agent looks
up the socket descriptor of the Delegation Protocol channel connect the Delegation
Agent to the appropriate client's Delegation Agent in the peer_dasockmap.
Handling the Require* Chain
Sending a RequireDemonstration message to a deputy can result in the deputy Del-
egation Agent sending a RequireDelegation message to another client, initiating an
arbitrarily-long chain of RequireDelegation messages sent from service to deputy,
deputy to deputy, ..., deputy to client, and client to user. Eventually, a RequireDel-
egation message will reach a user's Delegation Agent who may send a Delegate mes-
sage back up the chain. Each Delegation Agent must maintain state remembering
each outstanding RequireDelegation and RequireDemonstration that it has sent, and
the parameters of the response it must send upon receiving a response to its Re-
quireDemonstration or RequireDelegation mesage.
Figure 6-3 gives an illustration of the chain of Require* messages and correspond-
ing chain of Delegate and DemonstrateAuthority responses that must occur when
a user decides to delegate the authority that has been requested of him via a Re-
quireDelegation message. The arrows in the figure represent the transmission of fol-
lowing messages (numbered in the order in which they are transmitted) sent between
each of the depicted processes:
1. Reference monitor call asking whether "deputy for client for user" holds A1
User Host Service Host
2. ReqAuth Al, deputy for client for user, N1
3. ReqDel A1, client for user, N2
4. ReqDel A1, user, . 2
5. Delegate P,, N3
6. Delegate P2, N2
7. DemoAuth P3, N1
8. Affirmative reference monitor call response
From the viewpoint of service Delegation Agent depicted in Figure 6-3, the fol-
lowing series of events must occur:
1. The service Delegation Agent receives a reference monitor call, message 1, from
a legacy service process
2. The service Delegation Agent sends a RequireDemonstration, message 2, be-
cause it has of whether the requesting principal authority has authority
3. The service Delegation Agent receives a DemonstrateAuthority, message 7, in
response to message 2
4. The service Delegation Agent sends a reference monitor call response, message
8, in response to the original message 1
Without some kind of state, the service Delegation Agent will fail to send message 8.
Each of the other Delegation Agents in the system will similarly fail to send messages
5 through 7.
2Upon receiving the RequireDelegation, the user Delegation Agent prompts the user asking
whether to delegate "client" the authority set defined by authorization policy A1 .
Maintaining Pending Response State
After sending a RequireDemonstration or RequireDelegation message, a Delegation
Agent uses the pending.response-map data structure to maintain knowledge of the
responses it must send; either a Delegate, DemonstrateAuthority, or reference monitor
call response. The pendingresponse.map data structure maps the nonce Nreq from
its RequireDemonstration or RequireDelegation messages to a vector containing the
following information about the message that must be sent once a response to the
RequireDemonstration or RequireDelegation message with nonce N,,,e is received 3 :
* The message type resp_type: a Delegate message, DemonstrateAuthority mes-
sage, or reference monitor response
* The authorization policy Areq required by the RequireDemonstration or Re-
quireDelegation message
* The identity ID of the principal for whom the authority set A,eq is required
* The socket descriptor respsd via which the response should be sent4
* The nonce Nresp that must be included in the response5
Handling a RequireDelegation for the User
The chain of RequireDelegation messages stops at the user's Delegation Agent. In-
stead of checking the known_authority-map and possibly sending an additional Re-
quireDelegation message, a user's Delegation Agent prompts the user asking whether
3The DemonstrateAuthority or Delegate message sent in response will contain the nonce Nreq
(see Sections 5.6 and 5.7)
4A service Delegation Protocol channel descriptor if the response is a Delegate or DemonstrateAu-
thority message, or the UNIX domain socket of a local legacy process if the response is a reference
monitor response.
5This may be empty if the response is a reference monitor call response because this is important
only for Delegate and DemonstrateAuthority responses.
91
to delegate the set of authority defined by the authorization policy contained in the
RequireDelegation.
In the current Delegation Framework prototype, the Delegation Agent prompts
the user with a very simplistic textual interface that might look the following6:
Would you like to delegate the following authority set defined by
the authorization policy:
web_banking@somebank.com:viewbalance,transfer_funds:my_accounts
to the principal "firefoxDfoo. somedomain.tld'"? [Y/N]
If the user responds affirmatively, the Delegation Agent constructs a delegation
credential P consisting of a single delegation certificate in which the user delegates the
identity displayed in the user prompt to the set of authority defined by the authoriza-
tion policy listed in the prompt. It sends the Delegate message containing P and the
nonce Nreq contained in the RequireDelegation message via the socket from which
the RequireDelegation message was received. If the user responds negatively, the
Delegation Agent sends a NoAuthority message containing the nonce Nreq contained
in the RequireDelegation message via the socket from which the RequireDelegation
message was received.
6.2.5 Handling the Delegate or DemonstrateAuthority Chain
After prompting the user, the user Delegation Agent sends a Delegate message, initi-
ating a chain of responses to the RequireDelegation and RequireAuthority messages
sent earlier. Upon receiving a Delegate or Demonstrate Message, a Delegation Agent
verifies the delegation credential C contained in the Delegate or DemosntrateAuthor-
ity Message'. If the credential is valid, the Delegation Agent inserts an entry mapping
6 Despite being an important issue for a successfully-deployable Delegation Framework, the de-
velopment of an effective and usable user interface is a considerably difficult task and is outside the
scope of this thesis.
7If the message is a DemonstrateAuthority message, the credential C provides evidence that the
authority of the client sending the message. When verifying the delegation credential, the service
the subject of the credential to the credential C into its known-authority.map data
structure. The known_authority-map entry allows the Delegation agent to handle
subsequent RequireAuthority, RequireDelegation, and reference monitor calls with
an immediate response instead of initiating a potentially long series of Delegation
Protocol messages.
Using Pending Response State
After verifying the credential and storing it in the known_authoritymap data struc-
ture, the Delegation Agent looks up the nonce Nreq contained in the Delegate or
DemonstrateAuthority message in the pendingresponse-map to identify the cor-
rect outstanding response parameters that must be sent. If an entry exists in the
pendingresponse.map, the Delegation Agent checks whether the authorization pol-
icy Areq contained in the entry is satisfied by the delegation credential C.
If the policy is not satisfied and resptype specifies a reference monitor call re-
sponse, the Delegation Agent send a reference monitor call response via respsd
indicating that the application protocol request is not authorized. If resp_type spec-
ifies a Delegate or DemonstrateAuthority response, a NoAuthority message containing
nonce Nesp is sent via resp_sd.
If the policy is satisfied and resptype specifies a reference monitor call response,
the Delegation Agent send an affirmative reference monitor call response via respfd
indicating that the application protocol request is not authorized. If resptype speci-
fies a DemonstrateAuthority response, the Delegation Agent sends a DemonstrateAu-
thority message containing the delegation credential C and nonce Nresp via resp_fd.
If resptype specifies a Delegate response, the proper response requires the Del-
egation Agent to craft a new delegation certificate and update the delegation cre-
dential C to prove the delegate's authority. First, if the Delegation Agent uses a
Delegation Agent also verifies that the issuer of the first delegation certificate holds the specified
authority in its local access control list (see Section 4.4).
temporary key, it appends the delegation certificate that delegates it the permanent
principal's authority to C'. Second, the Delegation Agent crafts a new delegation
certificate in which it delegates the authority Areq to the identity ID values from
the pendingresponsemap entry, and appends this certificate to C. Next, the Dele-
gation Agent sends a Delegate message containing the newly-constructed delegation
credential C' and nonce Nresp via respfid.
Finally, in all cases, the pending-respmap entry for nonce Nreq is deleted.
6.2.6 Handling a NoAuthority Message Response
A Delegation Agent also handles a NoAuthority messages by looking up its nonce
Nee in the pendingrespmap. If the resptype value specifies reference monitor call
response, the Delegation Agent sends the reference monitor call response indicating
that the application protocol flow's principal does not hold the required authority.
If the the resp_type value specifies a Delegate or DemonstrateAuthority message,
the Delegation Agent sends a NoAuthority message containing the nonce Nresp via
respfd.
6.2.7 Handling a Connection Shutdown
A legacy client or service process must inform its Delegation Agent when it closes an
application protocol flow. This allows the Delegation Agent to clear state that is no
longer necessary. The legacy process reports the flow identifier of the flow being closed.
The Delegation Agent clears any entries that may exist in the flow.parentmap and
client_speaks-formap data structures. The Delegation Agent does not return any
information to the legacy process in response to the flow shutdown report.
8Typically, the delegation certificate contains the authorization policy **: * * (see Section 4.3).
Chapter 7
The Delegation Framework Library
Client and service software requires an interface through which it may participate in
the Delegation Framework. This interface must enable the legacy software to:
1. Report important application events to its Delegation Agent
2. Superimpose the Speaks For Layer protocol beneath application protocols
3. Determine whether a client holds some authorities
The library functions are divided into three corresponding functional categories:
* Speaks For Layer Protocol implementation
* Socket event reporting
* Reference monitoring
The library is implemented in C and consists of the eight functions summarized in
Table 7. The check_authority() function provides the reference monitoring inter-
face. The socket event reporting interface is comprised of the reportsocket_*()
functions. The sf _* () functions implement the Speaks For Layer.
Library Call Return Value Callers Automated
checkauthority () boolean service
reportsocketsetup () identity name client X
report socketdependency() identity name deputy X
reportsocketspeaks-for () identity name service X
reportsocketshutdown() none all X
sflwrite_speaksfor () boolean client X
sflwritedata() boolean client X
sf 1read() (identity name, int) service X
Table 7.1: Summary of the Delegation Framework Library functions
7.1 Automating the Library Calls
An important goal of the Delegation Framework is to increase the ease with which
delegation can be integrated into legacy network applications. As is apparent from
the topics discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the Delegation Framework has gone to
considerable ends to avoid modifying application protocols and to handle delegation
credentials on behalf of legacy programs. However, it remains apparent that a consid-
erable number of modifications must be made to the code of a legacy program before
it can participate in the Delegation Framework.
Fortunately, it is possible to perform all or most of the Delegation Framework
Library functions automatically for large classes of legacy client and service software
using synchronous I/O. Seven of the eight Delegation Framework Library functions
can be implemented automatically by a dynamic interposition library that catches
various C library routines (indicated by an 'X' in the "automated" column in Table
7). Therefore, a programmer need not manually insert function calls into the legacy
software source code. The only function that cannot at present be performed auto-
matically is the check_authority() function. This eases integration of the Delega-
tion Framework with legacy clients (which never perform reference monitor calls) and
deputies that opt not to perform access control based on delegation credentials. All
end services (i.e., services that do not act as deputies) protecting privileged resources
must control access based on delegation credentials if the network application is to
derive any benefit from the Delegation Framework. Therefore, check_authority()
calls will have to be included in source code.
7.1.1 Authorization Checks in Deputies
Depending on the characteristics of a given network application into which the Del-
egation Framework is being integrated, services acting as deputies may also include
delegation credential-based authorization checks. For instance, an application may
be structured such that sensitive information is stored both on a deputy service and
on an underlying service used by the deputy. This may often be the case for some
kinds of database-driven web applications (i.e., the web service is the deputy and the
database is the underlying service).
In other circumstances, the authority to perform a fine-grained operation at the
interface provided by a deputy might require the deputy to be delegated the authority
to perform a more coarse-grained operation on an underlying service. For example,
the deputy is an IMAP-based mailbox service that accesses mail files on an underlying
file service on behalf of users. A user wishes to delegate a spam filtering client program
the authority only to read messages in his inbox and mark them as spam. However,
the fine-grained authority to mark messages as spam depends on the coarser-grained
authority to perform filesystem write operations on the user's inbox file. Authority
to perform write operations on the user's inbox file is sufficient to delete messages
from the inbox as well as mark them as spam. In this network application, it is not
possible to enforce the desired fine-grained authority at the interface of the filesystem
service. Therefore, an authorization check must be performed at the interface of the
mailbox system to properly prevent the spamfilter doing anything more than marking
messages as spam.
7.2 The Speaks For Layer Protocol Interface
Three functions implement the Speaks For Layer Protocol. Clients encapsulate ap-
plication protocol requests in the Speaks For Layer Protocol so that they are able to
intermittently transmit messages tagging the application protocol flow with the name
of the identity for whom the application protocol flow speaks. All of the functions
provided by the Speaks For Layer interface are made automatically by a dynamic
interposition library.
7.2.1 sf lwrite_speaks_f or ()
int sfl_write_speaks.for(int srv_socket, Identity *id, char *nonce)
A process acting as a client calls sfl_write_speaksf or() when it:
* Opens a new socket connection to a service
* The identity on behalf of which the socket speaks has changed
The function writes a SpeaksFor message into the socket srv_socket informing the
recipient service of the identity name (specified by the Identity object pointed to by
id) for which subsequent requests written to the socket speak'. sf l_write_speaksf or ()
is only called on a socket connecting the caller to a legacy service process, and never
called on a socket for which the caller behaves as a legacy service.
sf lwritespeaks-for () marshalls a SpeaksFor message containing the string
representation of the Identity object pointed to by id, and the session nonce nonce
and writes this message into srvsocket using the C library write() function2 .
sfl_write_speaksfor() returns the result of the write() function.
1The Identity object is a C struct implemented in the Delegation Framework. Any naming
collision that Identity encounters with another software package is coincidental.
2The Delegation Framework prototype uses 8-byte nonces.
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7.2.2 sf lwritedata()
int sf1_write_data(int srv_socket, char *buf, int size)
When writing on a socket on which it is acting as a client, a process calls sflwritedata()
on a socket to write application protocol data carried via the Speaks For Layer in
place of a C library write(). The function marshalls a Speaks For Layer "Data"
message containing size bytes of data pointed to by buf, and writes this message
into srvsocket using the C library write() function. sflwritedata() returns
the result of the write() function.
7.2.3 sf 1read()
int sfl_read(int cli_socket, char *buf, size_t bytes, Identity **id,
char **nonce)
When reading from a socket on which it acts as a service, a process calls sflread()
in place of read(). sfl read() reads SpeaksFor and "Data" Speaks For Layer Pro-
tocol messages from clisocket. Having no knowledge of whether a SpeaksFor or
"Data" message will be received next, the caller passes three return parameters, buf
that is bytes bytes long and return parameters Identity object pointer id and nonce
byte string pointer nonce. sflread() performs a C library read() function on
clisocket to receive the next Speaks For Layer message.
If the received message is a SpeaksFor message, the an Identity object is allocated
containing the name of the identity contained in the SpeaksFor message. Memory is
also allocated for the session nonce contained in the SpeaksFor message and returned
via the nonce return argument. The memory pointed to by both the id and nonce
must be freed by the caller. It does not modify buf and returns 0.
If the received message is a "Data" message, sflread() fills buf with bytes
worth of data and sets id and nonce to NULL. If the "Data" message carried more
than bytes bytes of data, the excess is left in the socket buffer for reading during
a subsequent call to sfl.read() and internal state is marked to reflect this. Future
calls to sflread() treat the left over data as a new "Data" message and will return
the data. If the "Data" message carried less than bytes bytes, sf 1.read() will
not attempt to read additional Speaks For Layer messages. sfl_ 1ead() returns the
number of bytes read into memory starting at buf.
7.3 The Socket Event Reporting Interface
The four reportsocket_* () functions comprise the portion of the Delegation Frame-
work Library through which both clients and services communicate with the Dele-
gation Agent. These functions help the Delegation Agent properly assist the calling
process via the Delegation Protocol and provide the appropriate contents of Speaks
For Layer Protocol messages.
All calls to the functions described in this section can be handled automatically by
the dynamic interposition library (see Section 7.5). Therefore, a developer integrating
the Delegation Framework into an existing system need not be familiar with these
functions beyond understanding their purpose and knowing that they are handled
automatically by a dynamic interposition library.
Socket descriptors passed to these calls are marshalled into strings representing
unique flow identifier of the TCP flow associated with the socket descriptor. The
strings are represented as the 4-tuple (client IP address, client TCP port, service IP
address, service TCP port).
7.3.1 report_socketsetup()
Identity *report_socket_setup(int new_socket, int cli_socket,
char **nonce)
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A client; or deputy calls report_socket_setup () after initiating a new application
protocol TCP connection to a legacy service, but before writing any data to the socket.
The new_socket argument specifies the socket descriptor associated with this newly
created TCP flow. If the calling program is a deputy and initiates this new socket
on behalf of an application protocol request received from a client socket, it should
indicate this by specifying the client socket's descriptor clisocket. If the calling
program is not a deputy, it should indicate that it is not creating the new socket
on behalf of a request received from another principal by setting the cli_socket
argument to -1.
reportsocketsetup() marshalls the identifier of the TCP flow associated with
the new_socket and, if one is specified, the flow associated with cli_socket. The
function sends the identifiers via UNIX domain socket to the caller's Delegation Agent.
reportsocket _setup() then receives via the domain socket a response from the
Delegation Agent containing the identity name for which the flow associated with
newsocket speaks and the flow's session nonce, returning the name of the identity
in the form of an Identity object pointer and the session nonce by setting the nonce
return parameter.
The caller must subsequently pass newsocket and the returned Identity object
and session nonce as the arguments to the sfl_write_speaksfor() function (de-
scribed in Section 7.2.1). Also, the caller must remember the session nonce for any
subsequent SpeaksFor messages that may need to be written regarding the flow asso-
ciated with the socket descriptor new_socket.
7.3.2 report _socket _dependency ()
Identity *reportsocket_dependency(int srv_socket, int clisocket)
A deputy calls report_socketdependency () to indicate that an application pro-
tocol request is about to be written to the socket srvysocket on behalf of an appli-
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cation protocol request received from the socket clisocket. Unlike in
report_socket setup(), clisocket cannot be set to -1.
report socketdependency () marshalls the TCP flow identifiers associated with
srv_socket and clisocket into a message and sends the message via UNIX domain
socket to the caller's Delegation Agent. report _socket_dependency() then receives
via the domain socket a response from the Delegation Agent containing the name
of the identity for which the flow associated with srv_socket speaks, returning the
name of the identity in the form of an Identity object pointer.
The caller must subsequently pass srvsocket and the returned Identity object
pointer as the arguments to the sfl_writespeaksifor() function along with the
session nonce that was saved following the preceding call to reportsocketsetup()
(see Section 7.2.1).
7.3.3 reportsocket _speaksf or()
Identity *reportsocket_speaks_for(int cli_socket, Identity *id,
char *nonce)
A deputy or service calls report socket _speaksf or () after having been returned
an Identity object pointer and session nonce by the sflread() function (described
in Section 7.2.3) on a client socket. The cli_socket argument must be the socket
argument passed to the sf 1read() call that returned the Identity object.
reportsocketspeaks for () marshalls the identifier of the TCP flow associated
with cli_socket, the Identity object pointed to by id, and the session nonce pointed
to by nonce into a serial message. It sends the message via UNIX domain socket
to the caller's Delegation Agent. The function then receives via the domain socket
a response from the Delegation Agent containing the name of the identity for which
flows initiated on behalf of requests received from clisocket speak. This return
value will only be important in the case of a deputy who initiates socket connections
102
and makes application protocol requests on behalf of its clients.
The deputy must maintain state identifying the child sockets working on each
client socket's behalf, and correspondingly call sfl_writespeaks_for() once for
each one of these sockets, passing the socket descriptor and the Identity object pointer
returned by report socket speaksfor() along with the session nonces that were
saved following the preceding calls to reportsocket_setup() for each of the child
sockets.
7.3.4 report socket_shutdown()
void reportsocketshutdown(int socket)}
A client, deputy, or service calls reportsocket_shutdown() immediate after
it closes a socket. No socket data should be read of written between the call to
report_socketshutdown() and the C library closeO) function.
The function generates a string representation of the 4-tuple that uniquely iden-
tifies the TCP flow associated with socket. It marshalls this string into a message
buffer, and sends the message via UNIX domain socket to the caller's Delegation
Agent. The Delegation Agent does not send any messages in return, and the function
has no return value.
7.4 The Reference Monitoring Interface
The reference monitoring interface consists of a single function, checkauthority ().
7.4.1 checkauthority()
int check_authority(int cli_socket, char *operation, char *subject)
A service calls checkauthority() to determine whether the sender of a client
request received via the socket cli_socket has the authority to request an operation
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on a given subject. The strings contained in the operation and subject argument
specific to the authorization policies that the service has granted to its users.
check_authority() marshalls the TCP flow identifier associated with clisocket,
and an authorization policy definition (see Section 4.3) formed by concatenating the
local deputy or service's identity name with the contents of operation and argument.
The function marshalls a message containing the flow and authorization policy def-
inition and sends it to the caller's Delegation Agent. It then receives a response
from the Delegation Agent signifying whether the identity for whom the client socket
cli_socket speaks holds the authorities defined by the authorization policy defi-
nition passed to the Delegation Agent. If the principal for whom the client flow
speaks holds the authority, check_authority() returns 1. if the principal does not,
check_authority() returns 0.
Responding to a checkauthority() may require the Delegation Agent to engage
in a Delegation Protocol dialogue (see Chapter 5). check_authority() will block
until the Delegation Agent responds. The duration for which the function blocks
depends on the delay characteristics of the network and the promptness with which
a user responds to a request for delegation.
7.5 Dynamic Interposition Library
A dynamic interposition library automatically implements most of the Delegation
Framework Library functions that a legacy process must perform. The dynamic
interposition library intercepts a set of five functions at the library functions. The C
library interface was chosen as the point of interception because it is both ubiquitous
across UNIX platforms and provides the opportunity to automate the correct calling
of most of the Delegation Framework Library functions. The interposition library
simplifies the integration process, and reduces the possibility of programming errors
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during the process of integrating the Delegation Framework into a legacy program.
7.5.1 Loading the Interposition Library
Each legacy client and service process participating in a Delegation Framework-
enabled system must have the dynamic interposition library loaded into its address
space. The interposition library is loaded into a target process's memory using the
LDPRELOAD environment variable3 . LD_PRELOAD instructs the operating system's dy-
namic linker to load the dynamic library into a program's address space prior to
all other dynamic libraries, including the dynamic C library. When the linker be-
gins linking any unresolved symbols in the program's code segment, the linker looks
through the dynamic libraries for the symbols in the order in which the libraries were
loaded.
7.5.2 Inferring Socket Dependencies
Within a deputy legacy process, the reportsocketsetup() and
reportsocket_dependency() functions described in Section 7.2 both require the
caller to report knowledge of instances when a socket is setup or written to by the
deputy on behalf of a request received from a client. A deputy program developed from
the ground up could handle this requirement straightforwardly, but understanding
existing code and modifying it manually will often be a complex and error-prone
task. If the interposition library could handle this automatically for all types of
deputy programs, it would make integrating the Delegation Framework significantly
easier.
While not a complete model of all deputy behavior, the Delegation Framework
interposition library employs a simple model that correctly infers socket dependencies
3The appropriate loading mechanism may differ on some UNIX platforms and consequently the
prototype implementation of the library may not be compatible with all UNIX platforms.
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for a class of deputy programs:
A deputy process sends an outgoing application protocol request (i.e., writes to a
socket that it initiated) on behalf of the client from which it has most recently received
an application protocol request (i.e., reads data from a socket open by a listenO
function).
This model works correctly for the class of deputy programs in which one or more
processes each handle requests from one client at a time using synchronous I/O.
The Apache web server is a notable example of a deputy program from this class.
Apache assigns each incoming client connection to one of a pool handling processes.
These handling processes read client requests and, when authorized, perform whatever
handling is necessary to fulfill them. Dynamic web content is often database-driven,
requiring the handling process to subsequently write requests to a database service
socket. Because an Apache process handles at most one client at a time, it is straight-
forward to determine the client on whose behalf any writes to the database service
socket were performed.
7.5.3 The Interposition Functions
This section describes a set of five functions that we insert into the C library of legacy
applications to replace five existing C library functions. The goal of these functions is
to properly communicate via the Speaks For Layer Protocol, and to communicate with
the Delegation agent when necessary. The five re-implemented C library functions
are:
* accept()
* connect()
* read()
* write()
* close()
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Structure Key Value
clientsockets n/a clisd
service-sockets n/a srvsd
currentcli_sd n/a n/a
socketparent.map srvsd clisd
socketchildmap clisd Set(srvsd)
socket-nonce-map srvsd nonce
Table 7.2: Summary of the interposition library data structures
Instead of completely replacing the implementation of a function, the replacement
implementations of these functions call into the actual C library functions whose
place they take. The re-implemented versions of these functions are referred to with
a new_ prefix. Calls to the C library implementations of the functions have the prefix
original .
The interposition library implementation maintains the data structures in Table
7.2. client_sockets is the set of socket descriptors for which the socket connec-
tion peer is a client. service_sockets is the set of socket descriptors for which
the socket connection peer is a service. current_clisd is the socket descriptor
within clientsockets on which the application has most recently performed a
read() function. If a socket descriptor in servicesockets was initiated on behalf
of a socket descriptor in clientsockets (as would occur in a deputy application),
socket_parentmap maintains a mapping from the "child" service socket to the "par-
ent" client socket on whose behalf it was initiated. socket _child.map maintains
the reverse of the mapping in socket_.parent _map. socketnonce-map maintains a
mapping between a service socket and the session nonce that must be written into
Speaks For Layer Protocol messages (see Section 5.5.1 for a description of session
nonces). These data structures are discussed where appropriate in the discussion of
this section.
4The Delegation Framework interposition library resolves the memory address of a given func-
tion's original C library implementation using the dlsym() interface.
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new.connect ()
new_connect () is implemented as follows:
1: ret +- originalconnect(sd, name, namelen)
2: if ret < 0 then
3: return ret
4: end if
5:
6: servicesockets +- servicesockets U {sd}
7: id <- report _flow_socket _setup(sd, current_cli_sd, &nonce)
8: sflwrite_speaksfor(sd, id, nonce)
9: socketnoncemap [sd] - nonce
10: if current_clisd # -1 then
11: socketparent map [sd] +- current_clisd
12: S +- socket child.map [currentcli_sd] U {sd}
13: socketchild-map [current cli_sd] +- S
14: end if
15: return ret
new_connect () is the routine used by a client or deputy to initiate a new service
socket connection. The original_connect() returns 0 on success, or -1 on error. If
ret does not reflect an error condition following the call in line 1, the new socket
descriptor is inserted into the service socket descriptor set service_sockets. Subse-
quent newwrite() calls use servicesockets to identify when data should be encap-
sulated within Speaks For Layer Protocol messages before being written to the socket.
Having setup a new socket, new.connect () routine reports the new socket to the local
Delegation Agent at line 7. The argument currentclisd value is either -1 (the ini-
tialized value), or a value set by the new.read(). The reportf lowsocketsetup()
function returns the identity name for which the new socket speaks and the appro-
priate session nonce for the writing of a SpeaksFor message into the socket at line
8. The nonce must be stored in the socketnoncemap data structure for subsequent
SpeaksFor messages. newconnect () call then checks whether the currentclisd
value is set to a valid socket descriptor number. currentcli.fd stores the socket
descriptor of the most recently read client socket, the socket which (according to the
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model described in Section 7.5.2) any subsequent application protocol requests must
speak for. The interposition library stores the parent-child relationships (i.e., a child
socket is a socket that a deputy uses to speaks on behalf of a parent socket) between
sockets in the socket parent _map and socket _child-map data structures.
new.writ e()
newwrite() is implemented as follows:
1: if sd ý servicesockets then
2: return originalwrite(sd, buf, bytes)
3: end if
4:
5: if currentclisd = -1 and socket_parentmap [sd] 4 current_cli_sd then
6: id +- report socket dependency(sd, current_clifd)
7: sflwritespeaks-for(sd, id, socketmnoncenmap [sd])
8: socket parentmap [sd] +- currentclisd
9: S +- socketchild-map [current_cli_sd] U {sd}
10: socketchild.map [current _cli_sd] +- S
11: end if
12: return sflwrite_data(sd, buf, bytes)
newwrite () properly encapsulates application protocol data in the Speaks For
Layer Protocol. If the sd argument is not included in service_sockets, data writ-
ten to the descriptor need not be encapsulated in Speaks For Layer Protocol mes-
sages. Otherwise, the data writing to the service socket must be encapsulated in
the Speaks For Layer Protocol using the sflwritedata() Delegation Framework
Library call. Before the data can be written, the interposition code checks whether
the current-clisd (i.e., the socket from which the most recent application protocol
request was received) is the known parent socket of the child service socket to which
the write is about to occur. If it is not, the new child-parent relationship must be
reported to the local Delegation Agent, which is done at line 6. The name and session
nonce returned by the dependency report function are then sent to the legacy service
process in a SpeaksFor message. The procedure then updates the socket.childmap
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and socketparent.map to reflect to current parent-child socket relationships. Fi-
nally, the interposition library writes the Speaks For Layer Protocol-encapsulated
request to the socket.
new_accept ()
new_accept () is implemented as follows:
1: ret +- original_accept(ld, name, namelen)
2: if ret < 0 then
3: return ret
4: end if
5:
6: clientsockets +- client_sockets U {ret}
7: return ret
A deputy or service process uses the newaccept () to accept a new client socket
connections. originalaccept () returns the newly accepted client socket (ld is the
listening socket), or -1 on error, at line 1. If ret does not reflect an error con-
dition, the socket descriptor must be inserted into the client socket descriptor set
client-sockets. Subsequent new-read() functions use client_sockets to identify
when to expect data carried within Speaks For Layer messages.
new-read()
new.read() is implemented as follows:
1: if sd ý client_sockets then
2: return original-read(sd, buf, bytes)
3: end if
4:
5: current_clifd -- sd
6: ret +- 0
7: while ret = 0 do
8: ret +- sflread(sd, buf, bytes, &id, &nonce)
9: if id # NULL then
10: iddep +- report_socket_speaksfor(sd, id, nonce)
11: for each child_sd E socket_childmap [sd] do
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12: sflwrite_speaks_for(childsd, id_dep, socketnoncemap [sd])
13: end for
14: end if
15: end while
16: return ret
Descriptors not contained in clientsockets, both for files and service sock-
ets (services do not encapsulate their application protocol response in Speaks For
Layer Protocol messages), will be handled normally using the C library implementa-
tion of new.read(). After being created by the new_accept() call and included in
clientsockets, a new.read() call on a client socket causes the current_cli.fd to
be updated to reflect the most recently read from client socket in accordance with the
model described in Section 7.5.2. When reading from a client socket, the sfLread()
call may return a SpeaksFor message. The contents must be reported to the local
Delegation Agent, and the new identity name for which the client socket's children
speaks must be forwarded along via the child sockets. new-read() loops until it
receives Speaks For Layer-encapsulated application protocol request data at which
point it returns to the caller.
newclose()
When a socket is closed, the corresponding state in the interposition library must
be cleaned up. newclose() function removes all state relevant to the closed socket
from the interposition implementation data structures. The function is implemented
as follows:
1: originalclose (d)
2: if d E servicesockets or d E client_sockets then
3: report socket_shutdown (d)
4: end if
5: if d E servicesockets then
6: socketparent.map [d] +- 0
7: servicesockets <-- servicesockets / {d}
8: end if
9: if d E client_sockets then
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10: socketchild_map[d] +- 0
11: client_sockets -- clientsockets / {d}
12: end if
13: if current_cli_fd = d then
14: current_cli_fd d- -1
15: end if
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Chapter 8
Integration Study of Apache and
MySQL
Though the Delegation Framework Library implementation makes it possible to inte-
grate the Delegation Framework with minimal or no manual source code modification,
it remains unclear whether the remaining level of effort to make a system delegation-
enabled is practical. Further, it is unclear whether it is possible to integrate the
Delegation Framework into a network application without incurring unreasonable
overhead.
This chapter presents a proof-of-concept integration of the Delegation Framework
into an existing network system. The system consists of a clients and an Apache web
server which provides content derived from queries on a MySQL database. In the
application of the Delegation Framework, Apache takes the role of a deputy working
on behalf of its clients to access the MySQL database. The MySQL database acts
as an end service which grants end users the authority to access tables and records.
Apache holds no authority to access the MySQL database that it is not explicitly
delegated by its users. A web client, the wget utility, is used to access the MySQL
database indirectly via an Apache-served PHP web application to which it delegates
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the authority necessary to perform the requested task on the underlying database.
Following a description of the integration process that took place, this chapter
presents a measurement of the additional Delegation Framework overhead observed
at the client.
8.1 MySQL
If MySQL is to control access to its tables using the Delegation Framework, it will
need to perform reference monitor calls into its Delegation Agent. Reference monitor
calls are not automatically integrating by the dynamic interposition implementation
of the Delegation Framework Library and, therefore, must be included manually
in the MySQL source code. This requires an understanding of MySQL's existing
authorization mechanisms and how these mechanisms will interact with Delegation
Framework reference monitor calls. MySQL version 5.0.22 was used for the integration
study.
8.1.1 Existing Authorization Mechanisms
The MySQL documentation provides a detailed description of the database software's
access control mechanisms [1]. MySQL checks for authority at two times: when a
client connects to a database service, and when the database service receives a client
request (i.e., receives an SQL query).
When a client connects to the database, MySQL attempts to authenticate the
client. The client presents a username and password, and may be authorized to
connect only from a, specified range of hosts. The username, password, and allowed
address range are stored in the user table within the mysql database stored on a
given MySQL database service.
After being authenticated and authorized to connect to the MySQL service, a
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client may send requests to the database service in the form of SQL queries. MySQL
performs authorization checks on each of these queries using records from a number
of tables in its mysql database. The user table, mentioned above, stores grants of
authorities on a global basis (e.g., grant the authority to perform SELECT queries
on all tables in a database). The db table provides authority at the coarse gran-
ularity of a given database served by the MySQL service (e.g., grant INSERT and
UPDATE authority on all tables in a database). tablespriv allows authorities to
be granted for specific queries on tables in specific databases (e.g., grant INSERT,
UPDATE and SELECT on tableA but only SELECT on tableB). Another table,
procspriv defines authorities to use different stored procedures offered by a given
MySQL service. The most fine-grained authorities are specified in the columns_priv
table, which allows query authorities to be granted on a per-column basis.
The entries in these tables are keyed on the identity (i.e., username) of that the
client as authenticated at the time the client connected to the MySQL service. When
determining whether to authorize a particular query, the MySQL service examines
the entries that match the client's identity in each of these tables. A client principal's
full set of authority is the union of the sets of authority granted in each of these tables;
if any one of these tables grants authority that matches the query's requirements, the
database service will execute the query and send the results back to the client.
8.1.2 Crafting MySQL Authorization Policies
For the purposes of the integration study, the goal was to have the ability to control
access on a per-table basis using delegation credentials as is provided by MySQL's
tablespriv table. This provides an administrator the ability to grant authorities
to perform specific types of queries on specifies tables. Defining a useful Delega-
tion Framework authorization policy for these authorities was straightforward. The
allowed operations correspond to the different query types (a boolean column for
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each of which exists in the tablespriv) and the allowed objects correspond to the
database and table names on which the query may be performed. For instance, the
following authorization policy defines the authority to perform a SELECT query on
the table tbl in the database data on the database service with identity named
database@foo.example.com:
database@foo.example.com:select:data.tbl
The database name and table name are concatenated together to form the complete
subject field value.
Alternatively, an administrator can grant authorities to perform any query on any
table in the data using the following authorization policy:
database@foo.example.com: * : data.*
Thought not implemented during the integration study, it is also straightforward
to define authority to perform a particular query on a per-column level. The following
authorization policy defines the authority to perform the INSERT query only on the
column colA in the table tbl in databse data:
database@foo.example. com: insert: data. tbl. colA
8.1.3 Adding Delegation Framework Authorization Checks
Understanding and modifying the MySQL code required about 15 hours of effort
(with some of that time spent resolving bugs in the Delegation Framework which
presented themselves while testing the MySQL source code modifications).
Understanding the Code
Given that MySQL has a sophisticated system for defining authorities, integrating
Delegation Framework authorization policy check was a conceptually straightforward
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task. With a few hours of examining the MySQL source code, I was able to identify
the sqlacl. cc source file in which MySQL's implementation of authorization checks
using the internal grant tables exists. A number of routines exists in this file, with
one corresponding to each of levels of granularity provided by each of the different
grant tables that MySQL uses (i.e., tablespriv and columns_priv).
The checkgrant () routine provides the interface through which MySQL threads
check whether a query is authorized by an table-level authorization entry in the
tables_priv table. This is the routine that must be modified to perform the appro-
priate Delegation Framework reference monitor calls containing authorization policies
that the client principal must satisfy.
The caller passes the checkgrant () routine a list of the tables to which a query
requires access and a bit vector specifying the types of queries that the client wishes
to perform on those tables. checkgrant () verifies whether the client is authorized
to perform each of the queries specified in the bit vector on all of the listed tables.
Though not modified for this integration study, the other authorization checking
functions in the sqlacl. cc source file are similarly structured and lend themselves
to analogous modifications, thereby making it possible to use delegation credentials
for authorization of SQL queries at all levels of granularity provided by MySQL's
authorization mechanisms.
Modifying the Code
Instead of eliminating the MySQL authorization mechanism in favor of a purely
Delegation Framework-based approach, my approach to modifying checkgrant ()
alters the MySQL authorization mechanism such that a query must satisfy both
the requirements of the standard MySQL tablespriv grant table and the Dele-
gation Framework-equivalent authorization policy. The following modifications to
check.grant () routine could be applied to the corresponding routines for each of
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MySQL's other grant tables (i.e., columnspriv, etc.), thereby creating Delegation
Framework analogues to each grant table provide by the standard MySQL mechanism.
Modifications to the check.grant () function totaled an additional 34 lines of code
to the its original implementation of 71 lines'. An additional 14 lines referencing
the Delegation Framework Library header files and a static data structure were also
included.
As check_grant () loops over the list of tables to check whether the client is autho-
rized to perform all required queries on each table, the modified source constructs a
Delegation Framework authorization policy matching the authorization requirements
that checkgrants () looks up in tables_priv. After checkgrant () has checked
that the client satisfies all tablespriv requirements, a complete Delegation Frame-
work authorization policy has been defined. check_grant () calls the Delegation
Framework function check_authority() (see Section 7.4), passing the constructed
authorization policy and the socket descriptor for the socket from which the query
was read. The socket descriptor argument is derived from an argument passed to
check_grant () called the thread handle. The thread handle stores information rele-
vant to the context in which the calling thread is handling client requests. The thread
handle includes the descriptor of the socket through which the handler is connected
to its client. The call to check_authority() may initiate a Delegation Protocol dia-
logue (see Chapter 5) and, if it does, will not return until the dialogue is completed.
The reference monitor call returns a boolean result indicating whether the client has
satisfied the necessary authorization policy and, if it has, check.grant() returns a
result indicating that the client's SQL query is authorized.
'Source code lines were counted using the "physical source lines of code" method [31].
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Building mysqld
Properly building MySQL required that the necessary Delegation Framework Library
shared library object, libdf .so, be linked into the mysqld binary. This requires an
additional argument to the MySQL package's configure script specifying additional
linking flags to use when building the mysqld binary. The Delegation Framework
Library and OpenSSL library must be included in the binary2:
$ ./configure --with-mysqld-ldflags=-L<Framework library path> \
-ldf -issl
Executing mysqld
When executing the mysqld binary, a number of parameters must be specified via
environment variables at the time of execution. These serve to properly load the
dynamic interposition code in the shared library object poser. so, and to provide the
Delegation Framework Library with configuration information. The location of the
UNIX domain socket for mysqld's Delegation Agent and its identity name are passed
in the DASOCK and DAIDENTITY variables respectively. The library files specified in
LD_PRELOAD cause the interposition functions, contained in poser. so, to be loaded.
The following is an example of the environment variables as they might be setup in
the environment mysqld when the binary is executed:
LD_PRELOAD=poser. so: libdf. so
DA_SOCK=/tmp/da. sock. A5g21F
DA_IDENTITY=database@foo.example. com
Within this environment, the mysqld binary can be executed normally without any
special arguments, causing the interposition library to be loaded and intercept the
appropriate function calls.
2The Delegation Framework Library implementation relies on OpenSSL for cryptographic func-
tions and random number generation.
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8.2 Apache
Apache plays the role of a deputy when serving a database-driven web application.
For the integration study, the Apache web service does not perform any authorization
checks and therefore can have the Delegation Framework integrated automatically.
8.2.1 Automatic Integration
Integrating the Delegation Framework into Apache was very straightforward, but did
require some modification of the interposition library for support.
Forcing connect () to be Synchronous
Though each Apache process handles one request at a time from one client, the
Apache web server using non-blocking I/O when performing connect () calls on behalf
of a client. This is a violation of the assumptions that socket I/O operations are
performed synchronously. This violation makes it impossible for the interposition
library's connect () function to behave properly because the C library connect ()
call may return a result indicating an asynchronous I/O operation is in progress. The
interposition library's connect 0() function cannot report the flow identifier of the new
flow to its Delegation Agent in this case, and also cannot write a SpeaksFor message
into the socket until the C library connect () function call returns.
This requires the interposition library's connect () function to force the C library
connect () call to be blocking by setting its socket descriptor argument as blocking3 .
Due to the multiprocess, synchronous architecture of Apache, this does not constitute
a major reduction in the web application's performance; in our system a socket must
be setup before a database query can be sent and therefore, blocking or not, the C
library connect() call must be completed before a MySQL-driven webpage can be
served to a client.
3This is done using the fcntl () routine.
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Executing Apache's httpd Binary
Because Apache does not perform any reference monitor calls, integrating the Delega-
tion Framework into Apache requires only that the Apache httpd binary is executed
within the proper environment. This environment will ensure that the interposi-
tion library is properly loaded and the Delegation Framework Library parameters are
available to it. These parameters are similar to those used when executing mysqld.
For the Apache web service, this might look like the following:
LD_PRELOAD=poser. so: libdf . so
DA_SOCK=/tmp/da.sock.G54x2D
DA_IDENTITY=web@bar.example.com
8.2.2 Challenges for Web Application Authorization Policies
Though this integration study did not involve performing authorization checks at the
Apache web service, it is important to consider the ease with which this might be
done if system administrators find it desirable to perform authorization checks from
within Apache. The Apache web server may not be able to define an authorization
policy domain that seems reasonable for all Apache-based web applications. Unlike
a database service, an Apache web service can serve a variety of very different appli-
cations with very different interfaces; an arbitrary CGI binary or HTML-embedded
PHP program can be executed to serve a page. Each of these types of web appli-
cations is accessed using the HTTP GET and POST methods, but these methods
are too general operations to perform fine-grained authorization checks for the op-
erations offered by a particular web application. Therefore, it seems unlikely that
a general Delegation Framework authorization checking implementation for Apache
will be useful. If authorization checks are desirable at the Apache interface, each CGI
binary or PHP program will have to implement its own reference monitor calls.
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8.3 Client Programs
The wget utility [30] served as the legacy client program for the Apache/MySQL-
based network application. Like Apache, wget required no manual modifications,
only that the loading of the interposition library and the corresponding Delegation
Framework Library configuration are specified in the execution environment. For
wget or other client program, the environment might look like the following:
LD_PRELOAD=poser. so:1 libdf. so
DA_SOCK=/tmp/da. sock. G54x2D
DA_IDENTITY=client@baz.example. com
In addition to the wget client, the mysql client program was used during testing
of the MySQL source modifications. Automatic integration worked well with both
clients without additional tweaking of the dynamic library implementation.
8.4 Delegation Framework Overhead
The implementation of the Delegation Framework was focused on serving as a proof
of concept, not as a well-optimized, high performance implementation. Therefore, no
effort was put into improving the performance of the Delegation Framework imple-
mentation. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the magnitude of the overhead
incurred due to the integration of the Delegation Framework. Future work on the
Delegation Framework can improve upon the shortcomings of the current prototype
implementation.
It is possible to measure the overhead incurred due to the Delegation Framework
by comparing the delay observed from the perspective of a client with and without
the Delegation Framework integrated into the network application. To perform this
comparison, one simply measures the amount of time from the instant a client sends
its request to a service until the instant when the client receives a response from the
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service. Comparing the delay incurred with and without the Delegation Framework
integrated into the wget, Apache and MySQL programs gives us a sense of whether
the overhead experienced due to the Delegation Framework will be reasonable in real
world system.
8.4.1 Experimental Setup
To measure the additional delay experienced by a client in a Delegation Framework-
enabled network application, a toy web application was constructed. The web appli-
cation, select .php, consisted of a simple PHP program executed within the Apache
deputy that connects to the MySQL database service and issues a SELECT query on
a table with a single column of integer type values, select .php responds to the client
indicating whether the query succeeded or failed. During the experiment, the table
was populated with 20 rows. This simple web application can be considered a reason-
able baseline for the minimum delay experienced in most any database-served PHP
web application; the performance of the average PHP-implemented web application
will likely exceed that of the web application used in these tests.
The delay between initiating an HTTP request and receiving an HTTP response
was measured from the perspective of the wget client. The delay was measured
both with and without the Delegation Framework integrated into the legacy soft-
ware components. The average difference in the observed delays with and without
the Delegation Framework provide an estimate of the performance overhead that a
network application can be expected to incur when integrated with the Delegation
Framework.
To measure the delay, the wget client program is instrumented with timing code
capable of microsecond precision4 . The timing code measures the amount of time
that the program's retrieveurl () routine takes to execute and return. The
4Microsecond precision is available using the gettimeofday() C library routine, though the clock
in a given hardware platform may not support microsecond timing.
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retrieve.url () sets up the application protocol socket setup with Apache if nec-
essary, retrieves the specified URL, and writes the output to a file. If a TCP
socket has already been setup with a specific web service (i.e., during the first call
to retrieveurl ()), it will be reused for subsequent retrievals from the same web
service.
In a real world system, a user would interact with its Delegation Agent during
a Delegation Protocol dialogue (see Section 6.2.4). In order to eliminate the human
response delay factor from the experiment, the user Delegation Agent was modified
not to prompt the user. Instead, the user Delegation Agent behaves as though its user
had authorized the delegation without waiting for a user response. This allows the
experiment to focus on the measurement of delay derived from parameters excluding
the user involved (i.e., implementation performance).
For the experiment, the user Delegation Agent and wget along with its Delegation
Agent were executed on the same network host. The MySQL and Apache services
were executed on two additional independent network hosts. The three machines
were connected via a dedicated network switch carrying only the traffic between the
three hosts involved in the test and remote login traffic from a fourth machine.
Four separate trial sets were run; one or two wget clients were used and the
Delegation Framework was or was not integrated in a given trial, constituting the
total of four sets of trials. In each trial set, five individual trials in which each
client issued 100 successive HTTP requests for the select. php page served by the
Apache web deputy (requiring Apache to initiate a TCP connection to the underlying
MySQL database service to which select. php program connects). The length of time
for which the retrieveurl () executed was recorded for each of the HTTP requests
issued by wget.
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# clients 1 2
Average Normal (ms) 12.72 10.48
Std. Dev. Normal (ms) 2.33 2.65
Average with Framework (ms) 323.71 634.56
Std. Dev. with Framework (ms) 1.53 199.08
Average Added Delay (ms) 310.99 624.07
% Average Delay Increase 2545 5953
Table 8.1: Delay statistics for initial HTTP query
8.4.2 Results and Analysis
For the analysis of results, the initial query sent by each instance of wget during a
given trial set is treated as distinct from all subsequent trials in the same set. Due to
the implementation of wget, the initial request is the only request for which a new
HTTP socket is opened. All subsequent queries reuse the HTTP socket. Therefore,
the measured delay of the initial query will include the delay incurred due to the TCP
handshake between wget and Apache. Additionally, the initial query during a given
set of trials with the Delegation Framework will include the delay due to the initial
negotiations of Delegation Protocol sessions between the wget and Apache, as well
as Apache and MySQL. This allows us to consider the Delegation Framework setup
overhead distinctly from the steady state overhead.
Initial Query Delay
Table 8.1 lists the statistics gathered regarding the initial queries across the one and
two client trial sets, both with and without the Delegation Framework integrated.
The delay measurements are given in milliseconds. The "normal" values represent
those taken without the Delegation Framework integrated. In the single client trials,
the initial query took 369 milliseconds with the Delegation Framework involved where
they took 13 milliseconds without the Delegation Framework, indicating an average
of 356 milliseconds of additional delay. In the two client trial sets, the initial query
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of each client took 635 milliseconds on average with the Delegation Framework inte-
grated as compared to an average of 10 milliseconds without, representing an average
additional delay of 624 milliseconds.
Though the figures of a 28.0 times and 59.5 times increases in delay (in the one
and two client cases respectively) seem alarming, they may not seem unreasonable
in the context of more complex web applications. a real world web applications is
typically much more complex than the toy web application used for these performance
tests and would incur similar amounts of Delegation Framework-related overhead as
the toy application would. Nevertheless, this additional delay is considerable.
Little of the delay can be blamed on the network latency in the Delegation Protocol
channel. Table 8.2 lists the pairwise round trip time measured over ten consecutive
ping queries between each of the host pairs that must exchange Delegation Protocol
message 5. Each of the pairs of principals listed in the table performs the mutual
authentication protocol during Delegation Protocol session setup (one round trip time
for each host pair) and Delegation Protocol dialogue initiated during the handling of
the initial HTTP request (a second round trip time for each host pair), but this does
not account for much of the measured additional delay:
2RTT * (0.016 + 0.165 + 0.223)ms/RTT = 0.808ms.
Most of the additional delay is incurred due to processing overhead within the
Delegation Framework implementation. The considerable amount experienced during
the initial query is due to the cryptographic processing of multiple certificates during
the Delegation Protocol session setup dialogue (see Section 5.4) and the subsequent
dialogue in which authority requirements and delegation credentials are transmitted
(see Section 5.8). A considerable amount of time is spent in the prototype imple-
mentation marshalling and unmarshalling the large Delegation Protocol messages as
well as encapsulating and de-encapsulating application data in the Speaks For Layer
5The user and client Delegation Agents are executed on the same host, but communicate using
the TCP/IP stack as they would if they were communicating via a network.
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Host Pair Avg. (ms) Dev. (ms)
user-client 0.016 0.006
client-deputy 0.165 0.035
deputy-service 0.223 0.040
Table 8.2: Round trip times between the network application's host pairs
# clients 1 2
Average Normal (ms) 5.82 10.10
Std. Dev. Normal (ms) 0.47 4.03
Average with Framework (ms) 46.53 160.24
Std. Dev. with Framework (ms) 4.05 86.26
Average Added Delay (ms) 40.71 150.14
% Average Delay Increase 699 1486
Table 8.3: Delay statistics for subsequent HTTP queries
Protocol. The client experiences additional overhead due to communication between
each process and its local Delegation Agent via the Delegation Framework Library
(some of which is also experienced in subsequent queries).
Subsequent Query Delay
Table 8.3 lists the statistics gathered regarding the non-initial "steady state" queries
in each of the four trial sets. The delay experienced by these queries is significantly
lower given that the TCP socket between wget and Apache is setup (select. php sets
up a new one each time it is run, but the resulting delay is experienced both with and
without the Delegation Framework), and the necessary delegation credentials have
already been delegated and presented. The delay times are given in milliseconds. The
"normal" values represent those taken without the Delegation Framework integrated.
In the single client trials, the initial query took 77 milliseconds on average with the
Delegation Framework integrated where they took 6 milliseconds on average without
the Delegation Framework, indicating an average of 71 milliseconds of additional
delay. In the two client trials, the the average subsequent query from each client
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took 160 milliseconds with the Delegation Framework integrated as compared to an
average of 10 milliseconds without, representing an average additional delay of 150
milliseconds. These figures represent 12.2 times and 14.9 times increases in delay for
non-initial HTTP queries in the one and two client cases respectively as compared to
the network application excluding the Delegation Framework.
Given that the Delegation Protocol sessions have been setup between peer Delega-
tion Agents and that all necessary credentials have been delegated and demonstrated,
the delay experienced by steady state queries consists exclusively of Speaks For Layer
overhead and communication between each client, deputy, or service process and its
Delegation Agent.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The Delegation Framework provides legacy client and service software with a dele-
gation mechanism for the passing of authority from one principal to another. The
framework, designed with deployability in mind, makes delegation possible in net-
work applications without re-specification of application protocols or the re-design
and re-implementation of legacy software. The Framework's prototype implementa-
tion further minimizes the effort required to integrate delegation into legacy software.
9.1 Contributions
9.1.1 Protocol Support for Delegation of Authority
The Delegation Framework provides two novel protocols, the Delegation Protocol and
Speaks For Layer Protocol, that make it possible to delegate authority for the class of
network applications which adhere to the client-server protocol model and are carried
via TCP. These protocols, together with a target application protocol, allow a service
to mediate requests made via the application protocol using credentials delegated
via the Delegation Protocol. This approach enables systems to support delegation of
authority without a redesign and re-implementation of the myriad application-level
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protocols on which they rely.
9.1.2 Integration of Delegation into Legacy Software
The design and implementation of the Delegation Framework simplifies the integra-
tion process by which a network application features the delegation of authority. Past
delegation systems implemented the mechanism in ways that were not conducive to
easy deployment in legacy systems. The Delegation Framework succeeds in imple-
menting a delegation mechanism with a realistic integration path into legacy software.
For many legacy programs, integration is possible without manual modification to the
program. At worst, a developer must include authorization checks in services that
handle authority-requiring requests.
9.2 Future Work
While the Delegation Framework has improved the ease with which delegation can
be integrated into legacy network applications, a number of challenges remain which
affect whether the Delegation Framework can realistically be integrated into existing
systems.
9.2.1 Fully-automated Integration
Currently, it is not possible to automatically integrate the Delegation Framework into
legacy applications. To benefit from the the Delegation Framework, services must be
manually modified to use the framework's reference monitor. Additionally, legacy
applications that perform non-blocking I/O are not supported. Future work on the
Delegation Framework should attempt to address these shortcomings.
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Automatic Reference Monitoring
While the Delegation Framework has made significant strides in reducing the effort
required to integrate delegation into legacy software, it remains unclear whether it is
possible to automatically integrate the authorization checks that must currently be
integrated manually. Recent research has demonstrated some promising code analysis
techniques for automatically inserting reference monitor calls into existing code [11].
However, it is not immediately clear whether their techniques are applicable to the
Delegation Framework. If the authors' techniques (or extensions thereof) are indeed
applicable, a future implementation of the Delegation Framework could be integrated
without any manual modification to the source code of legacy software.
Automatic Integration for Asynchronous Programs
Services that employ asynchronous I/O typically outperform their synchronous coun-
terparts [23, 10) and, therefore, are desirable choices for service providers. However,
the Delegation Framework implementation does not properly support asynchronous
socket I/O. Two aspects of the Delegation Framework's dynamic interposition imple-
mentation make dealing with asynchronous I/O difficult.
First, the interposed C library routines rely on the successful completion of syn-
chronous calls to the real underlying C library routines. For instance, the new_connect ()
call requires that the socket be completely setup because it must write a SpeaksFor
message into the socket before it returns. The interposed routines rely on the full
completion of new_accept(), new.readO, and newwrite() calls as well. Versions
of these interposed routines that are robust in the face of asynchronous I/O must be
developed.
Second, the socket dependency model used by the interposition library is not
suited for correctly inferring socket dependencies in legacy deputies that perform asyn-
chronous I/O. An event-driven deputy frequently switches between handling different
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requests from multiple client when it is waiting for one or more asynchronous I/O
operations to complete. When this type of frequent switching occurs, it is no longer
reasonable to assume that an application protocol request was written to a socket
on behalf of the most recently read socket. A more sophisticated model must be de-
veloped to handle asynchronous I/O before the interposition library can successfully
implement the Delegation Framework Library socket dependency calls automatically
for asynchronously programmed deputies.
9.2.2 Usability
The usability of a delegation system is just as important to its adoption as making
it easy to integrate with existing software. The current prototype of the Delegation
Framework has addressed some of the issues inhibiting the deployment of delega-
tion in legacy software, but it has not addressed the usability issues that remain. If
the Delegation Framework is to become widely deployed and used properly once it
is deployed, a sensible and intuitive user interface must be developed. The current
prototype provides only a basic functional console-based user interface. The autho-
rization policies used in the Delegation Framework may not make sense to users,
especially novices. They must be presented to users in a palatable manner. Research
on user interfaces for managing authorization policies must be conducted and incor-
porated into the Delegation Framework. Further, providing usable interfaces may
require modifications to parts of the Delegation Framework supporting the interface.
These issues must be explored along with corresponding studies of the usability of
any interfaces that may be proposed.
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